Yet Another Quick Ukrainian Interlude...

Wherein we show once again that Ukraine is frickin' doomed...

Here’s the usual analysis of the current Russian Ministry of Defense “clobber report”, omitting the operational details and concentrating on Ukrainian soldier losses.

MoD Russia, [8/16/23 5:11 AM]

Russian Defence Ministry report on the progress of the special military operation

(16 August 2023)

The enemy losses were up to 85 Ukrainian servicemen, two armoured fighting vehicles, four pick-up trucks, as well as self-propelled artillery systems: one U.S.-made M109 Paladin and one Polish-made Krab guns.

The enemy's losses in this direction amounted to up to 250 Ukrainian troops, three infantry fighting vehicles, four vehicles, one U.S.-made M777 artillery system, two D-20 howitzers, and one U.S.-made AN/TPQ-50 counter-battery radar station.

Up to 55 Ukrainian troops, two armoured fighting vehicles, three motor vehicles, and one D-30 howitzer were destroyed.

The enemy's losses amounted to over 140 Ukrainian troops, two tanks, three armoured fighting vehicles, three motor vehicles, as well as one American-made M109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system during the day.

During the day, the enemy's losses were up to 170 Ukrainian troops, three armoured fighting vehicles, two motor vehicles, and one U.S.-made M777 artillery system.

Up to 35 Ukrainian servicemen, as well as five motor vehicles, were destroyed as a result of fire in Kherson direction during the day.

Operational-Tactical and Army aviation, Missile Troops and Artillery of the Russian Group of Forces have engaged AFU manpower and hardware in 143 areas during the day.

In addition, an ST-68 radar station for the detection, identification, and tracking of aerial targets was destroyed close to Pervomaiskoye (Nikolayev region).

A command post of the AFU 72nd Mechanised Brigade was eliminated close to Paraskoveyevka (Donetsk People's Republic).

So we have 85 + 250 + 55 + 140 + 170 + 35 = 735 KIA.

Taking our usual 1.67 ratio of WIA to KIA (derived from the Ukrainian International Institute of Sociology poll), we multiply 735 x 1.67 = 1,228 WIA.

Plus “manpower and hardware” in 143 areas which, assuming a minimum of one KIA and one WIA = 2 x 143 or 286 losses.

So KIA + WIA are 735 + 1,228 + 286 = 2,249 total KIA and WIA.

Adding in two more losses for each of the radar station and the command post adds 4 more losses to that for a grand total of: 2,253 KIA and WIA.

Note that the figure for attacks on "manpower and hardware" could easily be adjusted up to, say, ten per location and would probably still be conservative. You don't waste aviation, missiles and artillery on two guys; the targets were probably much larger, but we're being extremely conservative here. If we did use the 10 figure, the irretrievable losses would add another 1,430 losses raising the overall total to over 3,300 per day, or over 101,000 losses per month at this rate.

A concern about wounded returning to the field has been raised. It has been historically the case that most soldiers wounded do survive and return to duty at some point in the war. However, it takes a wounded soldier at least five to twenty days to convalesce on average. This means that on any given day, the soldiers wounded on that day will be out of action for the next 5-20 days while the casualties for those 5-20 days are accumulating.

So if on day one, you lose 100 soldiers WIA and it takes 5 days for, say, 90 percent of them to return to the field, on day five 90 soldiers return to the field and 500 have been taken off the field, leaving a net loss on day five of 410. On day six, another 100 leave and 90 return and so on. Every day you are permanently losing ten wounded who could not recover. So on day six you’re down 420 wounded, not 410.

So on any given day, until the hypothetical war ends on day six, you are down 420 soldiers until five days past the end of the war when all soldiers capable of being returned to duty have finished convalescing. So 420 soldiers finish the war. But they were unavailable during the course of the war.

This is complicated by the impact of the losses on combat and operational effectiveness. If you have only, say, 500 soldiers on day one, and you lose 50 KIA and 100 wounded on day one, you are down 150 on day one, another 150 on day two, another 150 on day three, on day four you are down to 50 soldiers, ten percent of what you started with.

The impact on combat and operational effectiveness is clear. The war ends before those 90 soldiers return to the field.

Now of course the war lasts longer than five or six days, so returned to duty do have an effect on the length of the war. So during the course of the Ukraine war, the question is how much do those X percentage and actual numbers of returned to duty affect the combat and operational effectiveness and thus the calculation of the remaining length of the war. The answer is: we don't know precisely.

The US military considers that a unit at 50 to 69 percent strength is "combat ineffective", because the unit has "major losses or deficiencies"; a unit at less than 50 percent strength requires reconstitution before undertaking any new mission.

We have seen reports that Ukrainian battalions are frequently taking losses of up to EIGHTY PERCENT of their personnel (KIA and WIA). Numerous Ukrainian units have had to be pulled from the field and reformed with new conscripts - and probably the returned to duty. And there are reports that some units barely survive more than a few days or even hours at the front.

Then there's the fact that the newly reconstituted unit is likely to be sent into the same meat grinder as the original unit. This means the "returned to duty" are likely to be injured yet again and spend another five to 20 days convalescing - or will simply be killed on their second or subsequent return to duty.

In addition, the returned to duty are less likely to be in a hurry to get themselves wounded or killed again, which is very likely to affect their combat capability (assuming they had any to begin with, if they are conscripts trained for only a few weeks.)

All of this in my view has more impact on combat and operational effectiveness and thus the remaining length of the war than the mere reinsertion of returned to duty soldiers would indicate.

And further loss of combat effectiveness is likely to increase the total irretrievable losses of the army over time. As I've noted before, at the beginning of the war and through last summer, the rate of Ukrainian total casualties was probably 1,000 per day or less. Today we are looking at over 2,000 and perhaps as much as 3,000 per day, 2-3 times as much.

So again, returned to duty is unlikely to matter much in extending the length of time Ukraine can continue to perform credible combat and operational effectiveness on the battlefield and thus is unlikely to significantly extend the remaining time until Ukraine's military collapses completely. Even if Ukraine has in excess of 500,000 troops remaining in its army (and only a fraction of those are actually "combat capable" - a conscript carrying an AK-47 doesn’t make him “combat capable”), at a rate of loss of 60-100,000 per month, there is no way Ukraine can continue to fight for more than 3-6 months until combat and operational effectiveness are essentially reduced to zero.

At which point Russia will descend on the remaining Ukrainian forces with its full 500,000 or more troops with full armor, artillery and aviation support. The remaining Ukrainian troops will either surrender or be annihilated within a relatively short time.

Even the encroachment of fall rains and winter snow is unlikely to slow the Russian advance much because Ukraine will be retreating and armies take their worst casualties in retreat. And an army full of conscripts with little armor or artillery will be unable to perform a credible “fighting retreat.” Unless Ukraine surrenders, the slaughter this fall and winter will beggar anything that has happened so far.