I think the simpler explanation is the one most of the analysts are using: desperation. It's also possible that the brainwashing they've been undergoing for the last 9 years might still be effective. Also, I suppose Scott Ritter is right when he says these people are brave and believe they are fighting for their country - which in my anarchist view is precisely brainwashing, although Ritter wouldn't agree, being a patriot himself.
You are entirely correct that they can't both exploit a breach and secure the entire line. This is precisely because of their losses and provides some of the best evidence for the army nearing collapse. As I mentioned, if they had 500,000 actually combat-capable men, it would be seen on the field precisely allowing them to do that. We don't see them doing that, so they aren't on the field, so they don't exist. Q.E.D.
Seems to me that in the context of ubiquitous and all powerful drones we see surprisingly little on the field. Incessant attacks across say a 10 km front give a recent history of many men and many machines having existed 'behind' that front: i.e. on the Kiev side.
But they apparently did not get interdicted. Every day a fresh wave comes 'out of hiding' and throws itself over the cliff.
Starting way back when they started taking out power stations I expected to see a point where the front here and there, in more and more places, became clearly ineffective or incapable of offence, whether sustainable, exploitable of not.
Look at the size of the attacks. They're all at squad, platoon or company level - rarely at battalion level. Across the size of the front this is likely all they can muster at any given point - which is why I don't see a huge reserve in the rear. If they had such a reserve, they would have concentrated it at a given weak point and pushed through regardless of casualties.
Of course, in this war, concentrating a force at battalion level or higher means you get wiped out by Russian air power and long-range missiles. This results in some confusion as to exactly how many of the Ukrainians are left. Nonetheless it's clear Ukraine can't mount a significant counteroffensive after two months of trying. If they had it, they would have used it by now. The spin in the western MSM about 'NOW this is the 'big push'!" is just copium.
As Mercouris noted on The Duran yesterday, first the Ukrainians tried larger armored attacks which failed disastrously, then they reverted to smaller pin-prick attacks, now they've been told by the US to go back to large armored attacks - resulting in the infamous "1 Russian tank against *" debacle. Now they're resorting (supposedly) to swarm drone attacks against Moscow which will fail miserably.
There's simply no there there any more.
And I don't think the Russians care to iinterdict them too far behind the lines - that increases the risk to Russian aviation from whatever is left of Ukrainian AD, plus why waste expensive long-range missiles and aviation on an enemy who's eventually going to come to you anyway. As soon as the Ukrainian reserves show up in a staging area near enough to the front, the Russian aviation, missiles and longer-range artillery hit them.
If the Ukrainians had any sense at all, they would retreat en mass to the other side of the Dnieper, abandon Donbass, try to set up fortifications on the other side of the river, and go into as hardened a defensive posture as they could manage. Not that it would change the outcome of the war but it might extend it slightly. The Russians would probably counter that by going into Belarus and outflanking the Dnieper., however.
It's essentially over but the necessary dying to reduce the Ukrainians to the point where the Russians can walk over them on the way to Kiev without significant casualties. 3-6 months tops.
I'm inclined to think that if they stopped this offensive, which they started in 2014, and retreated back to their own ground, the whole thing would end.
Not a popular opinion nowadays because it is argued that the rump state would become eligible for NATO membership and Russia obviously cannot allow that.
But I think it could well happen nevertheless. The peace could stipulate no NATO and so on. I just basically feel Putin is nearly always ready for peace.
I'm on record since April, 2022, about that. The goal of this SMO is to take Ukraine off the board totally - which means no Poland in western Ukraine, no Kiev regime, and a Russian military district in western Ukraine to counter the Aegis Ashore installations in Poland and Romania. Those installations are the primary reason for this war - that and the fact that if Ukraine remains in one piece anywhere, those installations will be moved there. Putin is not going to allow that. Russia's security guarantees are far more important than "peace at any price".
People just don't seem to get that. They think Russia "doesn't want western Ukraine" because "western Ukrainians don't like Russians". Even Martyanov thinks like this. So what? The Soviet Union owned western Ukraine despite them. Russia can, too. The need to counter NATO is far more important than the possibility of a bunch of disgruntled nationalists causing trouble. Russia has dealt with Chechnya and Syria, they can handle a bunch of ticked-off Ukrainians. They can find, detain and deport anyone with the influence and resources to cause trouble.
The military police, the Rosqvardia, the GRU/SVR/FSB will roll in behind the Russian army and take care of any such problems. People need to give the Russians some credit about this.
So no, I don't expect Putin to "make peace" after going through all this, regardless of what Putin may say now. Not unless he has a plan to get a Military District in western Ukraine by some other means or some other way to get those Aegis Ashore installations removed.
One point I'd make is that despite long range strikes, the majority of losses will come from the teeth arms of the infantry, armour , recce and combat engineers. These troops rarely make up 50% of any unit, and a lower percentage of any military as a whole. So a unit losing even 25% of its total strength is likely to be less than 50% combat effective and so on. You don't have to cause 100% casualties to cause a unit to become incapable. And it may well be that the Ukraine is approaching that point, albeit as you know I take a more sanguine view of this. However if it carries on like this it will lose its ability to attack on any sort of scale or to plug holes with a mobile reserve. This will be endgame territory. It might therefore be no surprise that the USA is now trying to promote peace talks. Good luck with that...
Yes, this is why I refer to combat and operational effectiveness. In fact, it appears Ukraine is at this point now, as reflected in the fact that they cannot even get past the "crumple zone" of the Russian defenses. If your force is unable to either 1) inflict serious losses, where "serious" means it affects the enemy's ability to do either offense or defense, or 2) grab territory by forcing the enemy to retreat, you've lost combat effectiveness. If you can't even maneuver on the battlefield, you've lost operational effectiveness. Ukraine is showing all the signs right now. Collapse can't be far behind.
I see signs of Ukrainian attack formations being half-baked training wise, like when a unit is starting to come together as a company but needs about 6 months more training to be a qualified battalion.
I think the most effective arms of Ukraine right now is the HIMARS+intelligence units : someone pointed out that grouped far back they are immune to shorter range drone and artillery strikes but can reach Russian artillery near the front lines without being shot down by Russian AD
My guess is that won't last long. The Russians have been shooting down HIMARS for months and if they see they're losing artillery to pinpoint HIMARS strikes, they'll roll up more AD and deal with it. Or they'll start a "HIMARS Hunt" just like they've been doing with Ukrainian artillery lately - they'll look for them, find them and take them out regardless of where they are located.
As for half-baked training, Scott Ritter on Garland Nixon's Wednesday Youtube video spent the first 20 minutes analyzing the famous Russian tank vs 8 Ukrainian armored vehicles video which has been making the rounds. He points out all the right things the Russians did in that engagement and all the wrong things the Ukrainians did - or more precisely the right things they didn't do. It was a good illustration of the fact that the Ukrainians 1) have the wrong equipment, 2) don't know how to use what they have, and 3) have lost the trained men who did know how to use it. All they have left, as Ritter says, was the courage - or in my view, stupidity - to keep moving forward despite having zero chance of winning.
Just one more evidence of my thesis that the Ukrainian army is very close to collapsing.
Being a dull sort I was looking at Krivosheev (see Table 79 p219) this morning and came across a statistic that might help illuminate your point on the loss of combat effectiveness. Between 1943 and 1945 the Red Army suffered KIA or died during medevac 3,316,072 men. 86% were infantry troops. Including other teeth arms (eg armour etc) the total rises to 96%. The point being as I made before is that combat effectiveness is lost at a much faster rate than one might think, as usually less than half the units in any army actually comprise "teeth" elements. Hope you find this useful. Worth buying the book albeit it has been debunked to a point - https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-price-of-victory-boris-kavalerchik/1125854249.
Yes. I've been trying to find some figure to indicate when on average combat or operational effectiveness is lost relative to actual total losses but I haven't found one yet. So I've been assuming that when half the force is lost, it's basically over.
Actually I just found one while typing this comment! It is the "gumball chart" in the US Army Field Manual 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Graphics. It states as follows:
"The gumball chart provides a clear picture of the status of designated elements using a color code established in the unit standing operating procedures. The chart assists the commander to quickly assess the status of critical elements and assists the staff to focus on problem areas. The color code chosen should be consistent throughout all echelons of the command. The following is a commonly used color code: GREEN indicates that the unit is at 85 percent or greater strength (combat capable); AMBER indicates that the unit is at 70 to 84 percent strength (combat capable with minor deficiencies); RED indicates that the unit is at 50 to 69 percent strength (combat ineffective, unit has major losses or deficiencies); and BLACK indicates that the unit is at less than 50 percent strength (requires reconstitution before next mission)."
So 50-69 percent is ineffective and anything less than 50 is incapable. So I was pretty much spot on with my half losses. So my estimate of 3-6 months probably needs to be cut in half because 3-6 months is simply for total loss of the entire force. Of course, even with loss of combat and operational effectiveness, that doesn't stop the enemy from fruitlessly throwing remaining troops into useless attacks - pretty much like Ukraine is doing now.
As for the book recommended, here is a review of that book which you might find interesting (free download via Anna's Archive):
Here is an extended article on WW2 Wehrmacht unit capability classifications. You will note that this is a complex subject and that combat capability is not necessarily related to strength/losses etc but clearly must be to a large extent. I'd say it might be quite difficult to assess either sides' units in the Ukraine war given the understandable reluctance to publicise accurate information. We can take a big picture view but no more than that. However if you take the 12 brigades in the 9th and 10th UAF Corps, then it looks like they have lost at least 50% strength so far, but maybe recieved replacements.
The Kampfwert rated the combat capability of the unit as a whole on a scale from one to four:
Kampfwert I: Suitable for all offensive operations
Kampfwert II: Conditionally suitable for offensive operations
Kampfwert III: Suitable for defense
Kampfwert IV: Conditionally suitable for defense
A full strength UAF Territorial Brigade might only be Kampfwert III for example, or even IV.
This is not necesarily related to strength:
Kampfstärke Term
Over 400 Starkes Bataillon (strong battalion)
301 to 400 Mittelstarkes Bataillon (medium strong battalion)
201 to 300 Durchschnitliches Bataillon (average battalion)
101 to 200 Schwaches Bataillon (weak battalion)
100 or below Abgekämpftes Bataillon (exhausted battalion)
You will note a battalion had a TOE of around 800 men but a battle strength of only 400 or so. Hence my point about 50% losses of the brigades as a whole above might have rendered those units by now at the "exausted" level.
thanks richard.. good work.. i can see this conflict stretching out longer, but aside from that - i am in agreement with you.. on the other hand, i see the wisdom in marcjfs commentary too, so maybe this will fold sooner.. i would like that..
It is horrific what the poor UAF troops are being expected to do and the scale of their losses. The sooner this ends the better. But alas, they seem keen to fight on. So far.
Thanks. I follow your stuff too, and a number of others. MOA is becoming overrun with trolls though, IMHO. Wonder where they come from? Still a good place to go but needs sifting.
I am not an expert expert but have made it a hobby (if you like) to understand military, political, geo-political and economic theory and history. I realised immediately that the MSM and my government was not telling the truth about this war and so have started reading these sites and trying to add something to the debate. And I have learnt a lot also and become much more cynical as events have unfolded. I try to avoid a Russian "fan boy" type approach and to deal in facts (such as might be available) and plausible speculation. And I try not to insult anyone. One can easily become personally invested in a narrative and have at times succumbed to that failing. Prediction is hard, especially about the future.
right on marcjf.. i am with you in all of that... a certain type of clarity is what is needed and it is impossible to find in the msm.. the msm has become the propaganda arm of the gov't!!! thus, we look for clarity elsewhere, like here at richards substack, or moa and etc... yes - moa is become much harder to navigate and i tend to look at the right sidebar to see who the poster is, to click on there name to take me right to their comment, as opposed to reading all the comments now... cheers!
Yes, the conflict will go longer in some sense. Even if the Ukraine army collapses in the next couple of months and begins retreating, it will still take time for Russia to roll up the contact line, consolidate its forces, make the crossing of the Dnieper, then get to Kiev and the Polish border.
Russia might even wait until next spring to do that, although I suspect Putin would prefer to finish this earlier. The presence of mud won't stop a Russian advance if it is minimally opposed. A retreating army takes the most casualties, so Russia can continue missile and air strikes on the retreating Ukrainians, so that even their "left-overs" hiding in the cities will be forced to come out and be destroyed.
After that, there will be months of consolidating the victory. Russia will have to move in the military police, the Rosqvardia, the GRU/SVR/FSB and begin the task of cleaning out the remaining neo-Nazis and extreme nationalists.
In the meantime, the US and NATO will be trying to establish a Ukrainian "government-in-exile" in Poland and other meaningless endeavors, as well as trying to explain - or simply ignoring - their utter failure.
With my 3-6 months, I 'm mostly just predicting when the Russian army will finally be able to start advancing and not just defending while Ukraine impales itself. But eventually Russia will need to advance and take Kiev.
There are those that argue that Russia needs another half million men to take Kiev - apparently just because it is a large city. I doubt that. The number of civilians in a city is not relevant. It's solely the question of how many combat-capable defenders are there. Even if the entire remaining Ukrainian force goes to Kiev and digs in, Russia can just use the Syrian strategy: 1) surround it, 2) cut off resupply, 3) do probing attacks to locate resistance, 4) send in urban assault to reduce resistance (Wagner or Chechens), then 5) wait for the city to fall. This might extend the conflict by some months, but it's irrelevant - the outcome will be certain.
From the Russian army perspective, this has been largely a stand-off war with Russia inflicting heavy casualties on Ukraine with missiles, drones, artillery, and mine fields, and few Russian casualties...The high casualty urban combat in Bakhmut was done by the Wagner mercs and very effectively..Ukraine having lost its air force and discovered that Western tanks and Bradleys are ineffective and easily reduced to scrap metal, Russia is continuing its long range attacks on both the military and Ukraine's economy, apparently waiting for Ukraine to collapse...which could be any time now..While the US now wants to pivot away from this mess so it can focus on China...
Good post RichardSteven. Thanks James for the link to here. I'm having the same issues with Moa trolls, feel bad for b.
Mercouris had an interesting comment toward the end of his post today, said there are talks between US/West and Russia but won't go anywhere, mostly because Biden is trapped and blackmailed by his own greedy, diabolical handling of Ukraine when Obama picked him to be "viceroy". The neocons have him pinned down at home and the Ukie kleptocrats have so much dirt on him, and then the Nazis have the Ukie money people in their sights if Zelensky looks like he's getting ready to flee or betray them. I agree with your overall assessment RSH: collapse is coming by Christmas. Won't be pretty but the way the Russians handled Chechnya gives me hope.
Yes, Russia has handled Chechnya and has handled Syria, so handling western Ukrainians won't be as big an issue as others think it will. Which is why I believe Russia won't allow Poland to take any part of Ukraine. Why give your enemy territory from which to cause further trouble to you, based solely on the fact that some people there don't like you? It's what those people can do about it that matters. Western Ukrainians tried that from 1947-1956 - they lost 200,000 people.
A CIA-organized insurgency by western Ukrainians against the Soviet Union. The insurgency killed around 20,000 Soviets - the Soviets killed around 200,000 Ukrainians. It finally petered out around 1956. The point being that the Russians know what western Ukrainians are about and will be prepared for any repeat, especially having dealt with the Chechen war and Syria in the meantime.
Some commentators have been saying that the conflict will last another year and having viewed the daily Russian MoD 'clobber reports' for over a year I just can't see it. In recent months, especially, Ukrainian losses in men and materiel have been staggering. I think it was MacGregor who said that we are witnessing the rare event of an army disintegrating in the field. These stats appear to confirm that - thanks Richard.
I think the simpler explanation is the one most of the analysts are using: desperation. It's also possible that the brainwashing they've been undergoing for the last 9 years might still be effective. Also, I suppose Scott Ritter is right when he says these people are brave and believe they are fighting for their country - which in my anarchist view is precisely brainwashing, although Ritter wouldn't agree, being a patriot himself.
You are entirely correct that they can't both exploit a breach and secure the entire line. This is precisely because of their losses and provides some of the best evidence for the army nearing collapse. As I mentioned, if they had 500,000 actually combat-capable men, it would be seen on the field precisely allowing them to do that. We don't see them doing that, so they aren't on the field, so they don't exist. Q.E.D.
Seems to me that in the context of ubiquitous and all powerful drones we see surprisingly little on the field. Incessant attacks across say a 10 km front give a recent history of many men and many machines having existed 'behind' that front: i.e. on the Kiev side.
But they apparently did not get interdicted. Every day a fresh wave comes 'out of hiding' and throws itself over the cliff.
Starting way back when they started taking out power stations I expected to see a point where the front here and there, in more and more places, became clearly ineffective or incapable of offence, whether sustainable, exploitable of not.
I submit we haven't seen it to this day. :)
Look at the size of the attacks. They're all at squad, platoon or company level - rarely at battalion level. Across the size of the front this is likely all they can muster at any given point - which is why I don't see a huge reserve in the rear. If they had such a reserve, they would have concentrated it at a given weak point and pushed through regardless of casualties.
Of course, in this war, concentrating a force at battalion level or higher means you get wiped out by Russian air power and long-range missiles. This results in some confusion as to exactly how many of the Ukrainians are left. Nonetheless it's clear Ukraine can't mount a significant counteroffensive after two months of trying. If they had it, they would have used it by now. The spin in the western MSM about 'NOW this is the 'big push'!" is just copium.
As Mercouris noted on The Duran yesterday, first the Ukrainians tried larger armored attacks which failed disastrously, then they reverted to smaller pin-prick attacks, now they've been told by the US to go back to large armored attacks - resulting in the infamous "1 Russian tank against *" debacle. Now they're resorting (supposedly) to swarm drone attacks against Moscow which will fail miserably.
There's simply no there there any more.
And I don't think the Russians care to iinterdict them too far behind the lines - that increases the risk to Russian aviation from whatever is left of Ukrainian AD, plus why waste expensive long-range missiles and aviation on an enemy who's eventually going to come to you anyway. As soon as the Ukrainian reserves show up in a staging area near enough to the front, the Russian aviation, missiles and longer-range artillery hit them.
If the Ukrainians had any sense at all, they would retreat en mass to the other side of the Dnieper, abandon Donbass, try to set up fortifications on the other side of the river, and go into as hardened a defensive posture as they could manage. Not that it would change the outcome of the war but it might extend it slightly. The Russians would probably counter that by going into Belarus and outflanking the Dnieper., however.
It's essentially over but the necessary dying to reduce the Ukrainians to the point where the Russians can walk over them on the way to Kiev without significant casualties. 3-6 months tops.
I'm inclined to think that if they stopped this offensive, which they started in 2014, and retreated back to their own ground, the whole thing would end.
Not a popular opinion nowadays because it is argued that the rump state would become eligible for NATO membership and Russia obviously cannot allow that.
But I think it could well happen nevertheless. The peace could stipulate no NATO and so on. I just basically feel Putin is nearly always ready for peace.
I'm on record since April, 2022, about that. The goal of this SMO is to take Ukraine off the board totally - which means no Poland in western Ukraine, no Kiev regime, and a Russian military district in western Ukraine to counter the Aegis Ashore installations in Poland and Romania. Those installations are the primary reason for this war - that and the fact that if Ukraine remains in one piece anywhere, those installations will be moved there. Putin is not going to allow that. Russia's security guarantees are far more important than "peace at any price".
People just don't seem to get that. They think Russia "doesn't want western Ukraine" because "western Ukrainians don't like Russians". Even Martyanov thinks like this. So what? The Soviet Union owned western Ukraine despite them. Russia can, too. The need to counter NATO is far more important than the possibility of a bunch of disgruntled nationalists causing trouble. Russia has dealt with Chechnya and Syria, they can handle a bunch of ticked-off Ukrainians. They can find, detain and deport anyone with the influence and resources to cause trouble.
The military police, the Rosqvardia, the GRU/SVR/FSB will roll in behind the Russian army and take care of any such problems. People need to give the Russians some credit about this.
So no, I don't expect Putin to "make peace" after going through all this, regardless of what Putin may say now. Not unless he has a plan to get a Military District in western Ukraine by some other means or some other way to get those Aegis Ashore installations removed.
Yep. I didn't say I could prove my feeling was warranted or even sensible.
It's just my feeling.
A fair number of disparate other voices believe that Putin would make peace well before any total takeover of Ukraine, too, don't they?
Such as I wait with bated breath for the truth to become apparent... or indications along the way that might show where the truth is...
One point I'd make is that despite long range strikes, the majority of losses will come from the teeth arms of the infantry, armour , recce and combat engineers. These troops rarely make up 50% of any unit, and a lower percentage of any military as a whole. So a unit losing even 25% of its total strength is likely to be less than 50% combat effective and so on. You don't have to cause 100% casualties to cause a unit to become incapable. And it may well be that the Ukraine is approaching that point, albeit as you know I take a more sanguine view of this. However if it carries on like this it will lose its ability to attack on any sort of scale or to plug holes with a mobile reserve. This will be endgame territory. It might therefore be no surprise that the USA is now trying to promote peace talks. Good luck with that...
Yes, this is why I refer to combat and operational effectiveness. In fact, it appears Ukraine is at this point now, as reflected in the fact that they cannot even get past the "crumple zone" of the Russian defenses. If your force is unable to either 1) inflict serious losses, where "serious" means it affects the enemy's ability to do either offense or defense, or 2) grab territory by forcing the enemy to retreat, you've lost combat effectiveness. If you can't even maneuver on the battlefield, you've lost operational effectiveness. Ukraine is showing all the signs right now. Collapse can't be far behind.
I see signs of Ukrainian attack formations being half-baked training wise, like when a unit is starting to come together as a company but needs about 6 months more training to be a qualified battalion.
I think the most effective arms of Ukraine right now is the HIMARS+intelligence units : someone pointed out that grouped far back they are immune to shorter range drone and artillery strikes but can reach Russian artillery near the front lines without being shot down by Russian AD
My guess is that won't last long. The Russians have been shooting down HIMARS for months and if they see they're losing artillery to pinpoint HIMARS strikes, they'll roll up more AD and deal with it. Or they'll start a "HIMARS Hunt" just like they've been doing with Ukrainian artillery lately - they'll look for them, find them and take them out regardless of where they are located.
As for half-baked training, Scott Ritter on Garland Nixon's Wednesday Youtube video spent the first 20 minutes analyzing the famous Russian tank vs 8 Ukrainian armored vehicles video which has been making the rounds. He points out all the right things the Russians did in that engagement and all the wrong things the Ukrainians did - or more precisely the right things they didn't do. It was a good illustration of the fact that the Ukrainians 1) have the wrong equipment, 2) don't know how to use what they have, and 3) have lost the trained men who did know how to use it. All they have left, as Ritter says, was the courage - or in my view, stupidity - to keep moving forward despite having zero chance of winning.
Just one more evidence of my thesis that the Ukrainian army is very close to collapsing.
Being a dull sort I was looking at Krivosheev (see Table 79 p219) this morning and came across a statistic that might help illuminate your point on the loss of combat effectiveness. Between 1943 and 1945 the Red Army suffered KIA or died during medevac 3,316,072 men. 86% were infantry troops. Including other teeth arms (eg armour etc) the total rises to 96%. The point being as I made before is that combat effectiveness is lost at a much faster rate than one might think, as usually less than half the units in any army actually comprise "teeth" elements. Hope you find this useful. Worth buying the book albeit it has been debunked to a point - https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-price-of-victory-boris-kavalerchik/1125854249.
Yes. I've been trying to find some figure to indicate when on average combat or operational effectiveness is lost relative to actual total losses but I haven't found one yet. So I've been assuming that when half the force is lost, it's basically over.
Actually I just found one while typing this comment! It is the "gumball chart" in the US Army Field Manual 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Graphics. It states as follows:
"The gumball chart provides a clear picture of the status of designated elements using a color code established in the unit standing operating procedures. The chart assists the commander to quickly assess the status of critical elements and assists the staff to focus on problem areas. The color code chosen should be consistent throughout all echelons of the command. The following is a commonly used color code: GREEN indicates that the unit is at 85 percent or greater strength (combat capable); AMBER indicates that the unit is at 70 to 84 percent strength (combat capable with minor deficiencies); RED indicates that the unit is at 50 to 69 percent strength (combat ineffective, unit has major losses or deficiencies); and BLACK indicates that the unit is at less than 50 percent strength (requires reconstitution before next mission)."
So 50-69 percent is ineffective and anything less than 50 is incapable. So I was pretty much spot on with my half losses. So my estimate of 3-6 months probably needs to be cut in half because 3-6 months is simply for total loss of the entire force. Of course, even with loss of combat and operational effectiveness, that doesn't stop the enemy from fruitlessly throwing remaining troops into useless attacks - pretty much like Ukraine is doing now.
As for the book recommended, here is a review of that book which you might find interesting (free download via Anna's Archive):
https://annas-archive.org/md5/cb9a0cfedcad3320cf5101590bb4e939
I also downloaded Krivosheev's work from there (thanks for the reference):
https://annas-archive.org/md5/dd5ad7ce4a0721685c45e46cd9a186f7
As an East Front Geek I have both books thanks.
Here is an extended article on WW2 Wehrmacht unit capability classifications. You will note that this is a complex subject and that combat capability is not necessarily related to strength/losses etc but clearly must be to a large extent. I'd say it might be quite difficult to assess either sides' units in the Ukraine war given the understandable reluctance to publicise accurate information. We can take a big picture view but no more than that. However if you take the 12 brigades in the 9th and 10th UAF Corps, then it looks like they have lost at least 50% strength so far, but maybe recieved replacements.
https://panzerworld.com/german-unit-strength-definitions
Kampfwert (battle value)
The Kampfwert rated the combat capability of the unit as a whole on a scale from one to four:
Kampfwert I: Suitable for all offensive operations
Kampfwert II: Conditionally suitable for offensive operations
Kampfwert III: Suitable for defense
Kampfwert IV: Conditionally suitable for defense
A full strength UAF Territorial Brigade might only be Kampfwert III for example, or even IV.
This is not necesarily related to strength:
Kampfstärke Term
Over 400 Starkes Bataillon (strong battalion)
301 to 400 Mittelstarkes Bataillon (medium strong battalion)
201 to 300 Durchschnitliches Bataillon (average battalion)
101 to 200 Schwaches Bataillon (weak battalion)
100 or below Abgekämpftes Bataillon (exhausted battalion)
You will note a battalion had a TOE of around 800 men but a battle strength of only 400 or so. Hence my point about 50% losses of the brigades as a whole above might have rendered those units by now at the "exausted" level.
thanks richard.. good work.. i can see this conflict stretching out longer, but aside from that - i am in agreement with you.. on the other hand, i see the wisdom in marcjfs commentary too, so maybe this will fold sooner.. i would like that..
It is horrific what the poor UAF troops are being expected to do and the scale of their losses. The sooner this ends the better. But alas, they seem keen to fight on. So far.
marcjf - i follow your commentary at moa.. you are one of the more insightful and better posters! cheers james
Thanks. I follow your stuff too, and a number of others. MOA is becoming overrun with trolls though, IMHO. Wonder where they come from? Still a good place to go but needs sifting.
I am not an expert expert but have made it a hobby (if you like) to understand military, political, geo-political and economic theory and history. I realised immediately that the MSM and my government was not telling the truth about this war and so have started reading these sites and trying to add something to the debate. And I have learnt a lot also and become much more cynical as events have unfolded. I try to avoid a Russian "fan boy" type approach and to deal in facts (such as might be available) and plausible speculation. And I try not to insult anyone. One can easily become personally invested in a narrative and have at times succumbed to that failing. Prediction is hard, especially about the future.
right on marcjf.. i am with you in all of that... a certain type of clarity is what is needed and it is impossible to find in the msm.. the msm has become the propaganda arm of the gov't!!! thus, we look for clarity elsewhere, like here at richards substack, or moa and etc... yes - moa is become much harder to navigate and i tend to look at the right sidebar to see who the poster is, to click on there name to take me right to their comment, as opposed to reading all the comments now... cheers!
Yes, the conflict will go longer in some sense. Even if the Ukraine army collapses in the next couple of months and begins retreating, it will still take time for Russia to roll up the contact line, consolidate its forces, make the crossing of the Dnieper, then get to Kiev and the Polish border.
Russia might even wait until next spring to do that, although I suspect Putin would prefer to finish this earlier. The presence of mud won't stop a Russian advance if it is minimally opposed. A retreating army takes the most casualties, so Russia can continue missile and air strikes on the retreating Ukrainians, so that even their "left-overs" hiding in the cities will be forced to come out and be destroyed.
After that, there will be months of consolidating the victory. Russia will have to move in the military police, the Rosqvardia, the GRU/SVR/FSB and begin the task of cleaning out the remaining neo-Nazis and extreme nationalists.
In the meantime, the US and NATO will be trying to establish a Ukrainian "government-in-exile" in Poland and other meaningless endeavors, as well as trying to explain - or simply ignoring - their utter failure.
With my 3-6 months, I 'm mostly just predicting when the Russian army will finally be able to start advancing and not just defending while Ukraine impales itself. But eventually Russia will need to advance and take Kiev.
There are those that argue that Russia needs another half million men to take Kiev - apparently just because it is a large city. I doubt that. The number of civilians in a city is not relevant. It's solely the question of how many combat-capable defenders are there. Even if the entire remaining Ukrainian force goes to Kiev and digs in, Russia can just use the Syrian strategy: 1) surround it, 2) cut off resupply, 3) do probing attacks to locate resistance, 4) send in urban assault to reduce resistance (Wagner or Chechens), then 5) wait for the city to fall. This might extend the conflict by some months, but it's irrelevant - the outcome will be certain.
i have a hard time seeing into the future, try as i might! thanks richard..
By the way, thanks for referencing my post today on MoA. That generated some 30+ new subscribers to this Substack and climbing!
Give the man a cigar! ( I too am a long-time MoA lurker too far out of my pay grade to comment ) Mighty glad to see RSH with a zone of his own!
From the Russian army perspective, this has been largely a stand-off war with Russia inflicting heavy casualties on Ukraine with missiles, drones, artillery, and mine fields, and few Russian casualties...The high casualty urban combat in Bakhmut was done by the Wagner mercs and very effectively..Ukraine having lost its air force and discovered that Western tanks and Bradleys are ineffective and easily reduced to scrap metal, Russia is continuing its long range attacks on both the military and Ukraine's economy, apparently waiting for Ukraine to collapse...which could be any time now..While the US now wants to pivot away from this mess so it can focus on China...
Good post RichardSteven. Thanks James for the link to here. I'm having the same issues with Moa trolls, feel bad for b.
Mercouris had an interesting comment toward the end of his post today, said there are talks between US/West and Russia but won't go anywhere, mostly because Biden is trapped and blackmailed by his own greedy, diabolical handling of Ukraine when Obama picked him to be "viceroy". The neocons have him pinned down at home and the Ukie kleptocrats have so much dirt on him, and then the Nazis have the Ukie money people in their sights if Zelensky looks like he's getting ready to flee or betray them. I agree with your overall assessment RSH: collapse is coming by Christmas. Won't be pretty but the way the Russians handled Chechnya gives me hope.
Yes, Russia has handled Chechnya and has handled Syria, so handling western Ukrainians won't be as big an issue as others think it will. Which is why I believe Russia won't allow Poland to take any part of Ukraine. Why give your enemy territory from which to cause further trouble to you, based solely on the fact that some people there don't like you? It's what those people can do about it that matters. Western Ukrainians tried that from 1947-1956 - they lost 200,000 people.
What was happening in 1947-1956 ?
A CIA-organized insurgency by western Ukrainians against the Soviet Union. The insurgency killed around 20,000 Soviets - the Soviets killed around 200,000 Ukrainians. It finally petered out around 1956. The point being that the Russians know what western Ukrainians are about and will be prepared for any repeat, especially having dealt with the Chechen war and Syria in the meantime.
Some commentators have been saying that the conflict will last another year and having viewed the daily Russian MoD 'clobber reports' for over a year I just can't see it. In recent months, especially, Ukrainian losses in men and materiel have been staggering. I think it was MacGregor who said that we are witnessing the rare event of an army disintegrating in the field. These stats appear to confirm that - thanks Richard.