And Still Another Ukrainian Interlude...

Wherein I establish that nothing is getting better for Ukraine in terms of dead soldiers...

Here is yet another analysis of the Russian MoD daily “clobber report”, this time for September 20, 2023, as reported from the MoD Telegram channel. As usual, we omit the operational details to concentrate on reported Ukrainian losses.

MoD Russia, [9/20/23 5:15 AM]

⚡️ Russian Defence Ministry report on the progress of the special military operation

(20 September 2023)

Part I (see Part II (https://t.me/mod_russia_en/9862))

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue the special military operation...

The enemy's losses were up to 175 Ukrainian troops, one tank, one armoured fighting vehicle, and three pick-up trucks…

Up to 35 Ukrainian troops, two armoured fighting vehicles, and two motor vehicles were eliminated…

Up to 70 Ukrainian servicemen were killed and wounded, two armoured fighting vehicles, two pick-up trucks, and D-30 howitzers were neutralised…

The enemy's losses for the day totalled up to 135 Ukrainian servicemen killed and wounded, two pick-up trucks, and one Msta-B howitzer…

Russian Defence Ministry (https://t.me/mod_russia_en)

MoD Russia, [9/20/23 5:18 AM]

⚡️ Russian Defence Ministry report on the progress of the special military operation

(20 September 2023)

Part II (see Part I (https://t.me/mod_russia_en/9861))

Over 65 Ukrainian troops, two motor vehicles, and one U.S.-made M1097 Avenger anti-aircraft missile system were neutralised…

The enemy's losses were over 60 Ukrainian servicemen, one armoured fighting vehicle, and four motor vehicles…

Operational-Tactical and Army aviation, Missile Troops and Artillery of the Russian Groups of Forces have engaged AFU manpower and hardware in 126 areas during the day.

In addition, the command and observation post of a battalion of the 72nd Mechanised Brigade (AFU) near Ugledar (Donetsk People's Republic) and the temporary deployment area of the 35th Marines Brigade (AFU) near Petropavlovka (Donetsk People's Republic) were hit.

Russian Defence Ministry (https://t.me/mod_russia_en)

So we're looking at: 175 + 35 + 70 + 135 + 65 + 60 = 540 KIA.

540 KIA times our usual 1.67 KIA:WIA ratio = 901.8, call it 902.

So KIA plus WIA from battle damage assessments = 540 + 902 = 1,442 KIA and WIA.

So far, a relatively slow day compared to the many days of over 2,000 KIA and WIA in recent weeks.

But we're not done yet... we have 126 non-battle-damage-assessments strikes to account for plus two attacks on a command post and a temporary deployment area of a brigade.

Following our usual procedure, we assign two KIA-WIA to each of the non-BDA strikes which adds another 252 to the total.

We assume the command post resulted in at least five KIA and WIA (it could have been much more).

And we assume the strike on the brigade deployment location produced at least the same number of casualties. You can watch it here on the Russian MoD Telegram channel: https://t.me/mod_russia_en/9865

So in total we have: 1,442 + 252 + 5 + 5 = 1,704 KIA and WIA.

Of course, the actual figure is likely to be much higher, depending on what the AVERAGE KIA and WIA resulted from the 126 non-BDA strikes. If instead of assuming only two KIA and WIA per strike we assume five or ten, then obviously the resulting figure increases to an additional 630 or 1,260 - which sharply increases the overall total for the day to 2,334 or as much as 2,964.

This is why it's important to consider those non-BDA strikes in the daily total. And almost no one but me appears to do that. This is why people consistently underestimate the number of Ukrainian casualties.

Some people speculate that Ukraine had a total of one million men under arms throughout the course of the war, if not at any one time. If we assume that at the start of the war through the summer of 2022 that Ukraine was losing 500-1,000 men a day as reported by the MoD and calculated using the above method, then Ukraine lost approximately 90,000 men from March to August, 2022, at the lower 500 per day rate, and 180,000 at the higher 1,000 per day rate.

If we then assume that as a result of the fall, 2022, Ukrainian offensive, and then around Bahkmut (where the Wagner group reported some 70,000 Ukrainian casualties alone), Ukrainian casualties increased by, say, 25 percent for the period from September, 2022, to end of May, 2023, then that works out to be another 625 per day to 1,250 per day for 270 days or 168,750 to 337,500 additional casualties.

If we assume the present Ukrainian offensive is producing an average of 2,000 KIA and WIA per day - which appears to be the case on every day that I've looked at it except today (admittedly not every day) - then for the past 110 days Ukraine has lost another 220,000 soldiers.

So we have:

Lower Rate: 90,000 + 168,750 + 220,000 = 478,750

Higher Rate: 180,000 + 337,500 + 220,000 = 737,500

So rounding up we get half a million to three quarters of a million men lost.

So even if Ukraine had a total of one million men under arms at one point or another during this war, they are now reduced to one half or one quarter of that number now. And if they had only 750,000 during the war, they are now reduced to 250,000 to, well, virtually nothing.

Recall that in a previous post I quoted the US DoD as saying that Ukraine had launched its current offensive with 150,000 troops. This of course does not count the remaining Ukrainian forces scattered around the country defending the major cities, the border with Belarus, etc. But it demonstrates that Ukraine does not have an effective force larger than 250,000 troops or they would have used them in the offensive and the offensive would have been more effective than it has been. Results on the field speak for themselves.

I never believed Ukraine had one million men total under arms, but perhaps I am wrong and they did. Either way, it doesn't matter. At the moment, Ukraine can not have more than 250,000 troops available throughout the country. They may have a million civilians doing logistics work in the rear areas, but they are not relevant to the fighting capability of the combat soldiers available at the front. Neither are Ukrainian forces hiding in the other major cities or the 20,000 allegedly guarding the border with Belarus.

Even if you assume that the vast majority of Ukrainian wounded return to duty over a period of 5-20 days, that doesn't really change the outcome for two reasons: 1) the returned to duty will end up getting wounded again or killed as Ukrainian units are taking 40-80 or even 90 percent casualties as repeatedly reported by Ukrainian units and officials themselves; and 2) Ukraine clearly has issues with retrieving the wounded from the field or getting them to primary care before they die, as reported by Ukrainian medical officials themselves. This is why the 1.67 KIA:WIA ratio is as low as it is. In contrast, when the Russians have reported KIA and WIA for a specific large engagement it has almost precisely been a 1:3 ratio. And the Russians have reported a 97% return to duty rate due to excellent battlefield retrieval and transport to primary care in the rear.

And Ukraine is still losing somewhere between 1,500 (rounding down from today's lower than usual total) and 3,000 soldiers per day, or 45,000 to 90,000 per month.

Do the math. How long can Ukraine continue to function - meaning able to maintain either combat effectiveness - the ability to launch credible attacks - or operational effectiveness - the ability to achieve meaningful objectives?

I submit the answer is quite clear: Ukraine is on its last legs. It can not last much longer than a few months, if that. It clearly has lost all operational effectiveness as it has not achieved any significant gains during three and a half months of a so-called “offensive”. It’s combat effectiveness is diminishing by the day, being forced to resort to foot-mobile attacks and husbanding its few remaining armor assets.

So I stand by my prediction that the Ukraine military on the front line will collapse within 3-6 months if not in half that time. Colonel Douglas Macgregor estimated on Judge Andrew Napolitano's Youtube show yesterday approximately the same time frame, saying Ukraine might hang on until Christmas or even into new year, i.e., three to six months.

Once the line begins to collapse, it will accelerate as Russia rolls up the line from north to south and vice versa until Ukraine is forced to withdraw from Donbass or risk being encircled and destroyed there. Ukraine will be forced back across the Dnieper River, taking even heavier casualties as they do so because armies always take their heaviest casualties in retreat if they can not conduct an effective "fighting retreat".

What happens then depends on whether Ukraine tries to set up defensive positions on the other side of the Dnieper - an effort I view as futile since they will not have the advantage of either the long defensive line or the hardened fortification lines they had built over eight years in Donbass and they will be taking hits as they try to build them. Russia will be able to consolidate and concentrate its forces and will likely be able to both penetrate and outflank the Ukrainian positions from both Kherson region and possibly from Belarus. This will force Ukraine to retreat further west, again taking heavier casualties.

Little will remain of Ukraine's military by the time the remnants reach Kiev and set up for their last stand. This also assumes that the military does not decide to either surrender (or at least request a ceasefire and negotiations) or stage a coup and overthrow their own government and then surrender in the meantime.

Ukrainian units elsewhere, such as around Odessa, will either have to remain hiding in the cities or come out to fight the advancing Russians. If they do the latter, they will be woefully out-numbered and out-gunned and will be annihilated with minimal casualties to the Russians.

The Russians will be moving forward with a minimum of 500,000 troops, an estimated 2,000 tanks, full artillery and air and missile power. Their advance will be slow as they will need to keep up the logistics tail, but it will be steady. I won't predict when Russia will reach Kiev - only that they will. I will suggest that the war will be effectively over by end of summer, 2024.

The notion of some people that this war will drag on for two to five more years - throughout 2024 and 2025 and perhaps beyond - is ludicrous. As I have said repeatedly, it is physically impossible for Ukraine to win, and it is physically impossible for Russia to lose.