A Refresher On How To Read The Daily Russian Ministry of Defense "Clobber Report"...

Gotta remember the little details...

Kudos to Moon of Alabama commentator “rumod” for posting the daily Russian Ministry of Defense “clobber report” of Ukrainian losses today.

Let’s go over today’s report in the same manner I did in an earlier post, examining the losses and omitting most of the operational details.

Summary of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of July 26, 2023)

Two ammunition depots of the 28th and 110th mechanized brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were destroyed in the areas of the settlements of Dyleyevka and Avdiivka of the Donetsk People's Republic. The enemy's losses during the day amounted to 210 Ukrainian servicemen, seven armored combat vehicles, three cars, two US-made M777 artillery systems, three Polish-made Krab self-propelled artillery units, D-20 and D-30 guns, as well as a US-made M119 howitzer.

In addition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' manpower and equipment were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Novovodyanoye of the Luhansk People's Republic, Torskoye, Yampolovka and Grigorovka of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The daily losses of the enemy amounted to more than 190 Ukrainian servicemen, five armored combat vehicles, four pickups, two howitzers: D-20 and D-30, three self-propelled artillery installations "Gvozdika", as well as a radar station of counter-battery warfare manufactured by the United States AN/TPQ-50.

In addition, the strikes of operational-tactical, army aviation and artillery fire defeated the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of the settlements of Malaya Tokmachka, Yablokovo and Rabodino of the Zaporozhye region.

During the battle, 22 enemy tanks, 10 infantry fighting vehicles, an armored combat vehicle, as well as more than 100 Ukrainian servicemen were destroyed.

The enemy's losses during the day amounted to up to 135 Ukrainian servicemen, one tank, three armored combat vehicles, four vehicles, the M777 artillery system manufactured by the USA, the Msta-B and D-20 howitzers, the Gvozdika self-propelled artillery installation, as well as the US AN/TPQ counter-battery radar-50.

In the Kherson direction, as a result of the fire damage, the enemy's losses amounted to up to 40 Ukrainian servicemen, five cars, as well as a self-propelled artillery installation "Acacia".

An ammunition depot of the 124th Territorial Defense Brigade was destroyed near the village of Zelenovka, Kherson region.

Operational-tactical and army aviation, missile troops and artillery groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation defeated 104 artillery units of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in firing positions, manpower and military equipment of the enemy in 128 districts during the day.

Two control points of the 21st Mechanized and 79th Airborne Assault Brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were hit in the areas of the settlements of Ivanovka and Novomikhailovka of the Donetsk People's Republic.

So we see here the following counts of Ukrainian killed in action (KIA):

210 + 190 + 100 + 135 + 40 = 675 explicitly claimed KIA

So far, this is lower than my estimate of daily KIA being in the 750-800 range and total losses in the 2,000 range. But we’re not done yet!

Going back up, we see this paragraph:

In addition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' manpower and equipment were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Novovodyanoye of the Luhansk People's Republic, Torskoye, Yampolovka and Grigorovka of the Donetsk People's Republic.

So four collections of “manpower and equipment” were destroyed, as well. We must assume that at least one Ukrainian soldier was standing there to be killed or wounded. So now we’re up to 679.

Now we have the “In addition” paragraph:

In addition, the strikes of operational-tactical, army aviation and artillery fire defeated the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of the settlements of Malaya Tokmachka, Yablokovo and Rabodino of the Zaporozhye region.

That adds three additional Ukrainian “units” - which implies multiple Ukrainian soldiers, not just one each. Let’s assume the “units” were merely squads or platoons, and not anything larger. A squad is usually 4-10 soldiers, a platoon 20-50. So taking the lowest numbers to the highest numbers times 3, we get another 12-150 Ukrainian soldiers killed and/or wounded - the reports says “defeated” which could mean either.

Assuming the lowest number of 12, we are now up to 691.

Then we have this:

An ammunition depot of the 124th Territorial Defense Brigade was destroyed near the village of Zelenovka, Kherson region.

Again assuming at least one Ukrainian soldier being killed when an ammo dump blows up (!), we are now up to 692.

Now we have the biggest and most important count that most analysts seem to miss:

Operational-tactical and army aviation, missile troops and artillery groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation defeated 104 artillery units of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in firing positions, manpower and military equipment of the enemy in 128 districts during the day.

This is a grouping which appears in almost all MoD reports. It represents Russian strikes by military components which apparently do not have the capability to do a Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), an after-action count of the actual effects of a strike. This makes sense. It is not always possible for a pilot dropping a glide bomb on a target to assess the resulting damage, or a missile crew firing on coordinates relayed to them via a satellite or airborne surveillance unit.

The important thing is to realize that there has to be at least one Ukrainian soldier killed or wounded in these strikes, and most probably multiple such.

This is particularly true in this case because the MoD is explicitly identifying these strikes as on “artillery units”. This means either one artillery gun, or more likely, an artillery “battery”, which can consist of anything from one to six or eight guns - either cannon towed by a truck or a self-propelled cannon on tracks. Which it is depends on the engagement: a Russian force might be under under attack from one gun which needs to be suppressed or an entire battery, and thus the Russian artillery counter-battery fire might be one gun or an entire battery.

According to Wikipedia:

In modern battery organization, the military unit typically has six to eight howitzers or six to nine rocket launchers and 100 to 200 personnel and is the equivalent of a company in terms of organisation level.

Here’s an example from a report on a Ukrainian artillery unit:

On the Front Lines with a Ukrainian Artillery Unit

Here we see one Western-supplied M777 howitzer being supported by nine men. According to Wikipedia, “The minimum gun crew required is five, compared to a previous nine. The normal crew is eight.” An artillery battery in contrast is much larger - as Wikipedia says, as many as 100-200 men, counting command officers, logistics personnel, communications personnel, and the actual gun operators.

Here’s a description of a Russian self-propelled 152mm howitzer battery.

So one Russian strike on a Ukrainian “artillery unit” could kill or wound anything from 9 men to 200! We just don’t know because no BDA is issued for these strikes.

The next variable is the effect of a Russian artillery counter-battery strike on a Ukrainian artillery unit. We see 5-9 men clustered around a single cannon, with others in the vicinity, where vicinity might be, say, 100 meters.

Explosive effects are referred to as “risk estimation distances” which consider the various forms of effects on bodies and structures and vehicles over various distances from an explosive device. There are studies, tables and the like that provide numerical computations as to the effects of various weapons. Examples for the US would include Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEM) such as FM (Field Manual) 101-60-2 (C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual Surface-to-Surface: Effectiveness Data for Howitzer, 105-mm, M101A1 (U) and FM 101-60-3 (C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual: Surface-to-Surface: Effectiveness Data for Howitzer, 155-mm, M109 (U). There are similar manuals for air-to-surface weapons fired from aircraft.

Without going into the weeds on this, which I am not qualified to do, basically what this means is that a given 152mm or 155mm or other artillery shell has numbers connected with it as to the probability of death, incapacitation, hearing loss and other injuries to the human body (or a structure) depending on the distance from the explosion the target is.

A report I found commissioned by the International Red Cross and developed by the ARES Armament Research Service in Australia (the link is a PDF download) contains this useful table and description:

Table 1.1 shows the distances at which various common explosive weapons affect personnel under training and combat conditions. The table draws on two US military concepts, minimum safe distance (MSD) and risk estimate distance (RED); the former is intended for use under training (peacetime) conditions, whilst the latter is intended for use under combat conditions. At the MSD, risks to personnel from the munition in question’s point of impact are considered negligible. The RED is expressed in terms of expected ‘percent of incapacitation’ (PI) to unprotected personnel, with .1 PI representing one in one thousand soldiers being incapacitated, and 10 PI representing 1 in 10 soldiers (10%) being unable to continue fighting (DA, 2007). The table provides a useful reference for common types of explosive munitions, and whilst the table expresses MSD and RED for US munitions types, these are largely analogous for other munitions of the same type and calibre.

As you can see from the table, assuming nine soldiers within 100 meters of an artillery unit being hit by a 155mm artillery shell, at least one in ten soldiers will be unable to continue fighting. Rounding up, at least one soldier will be killed or wounded. However, since most of the artillery unit’s soldiers will be much closer than 100 meters to the gun, probably within 10 meters, we must assume that several more will be killed or wounded.

You might find this article of interest: “How artillery actually kills you”.

So enough of the technicalities…how many Ukrainian soldiers do we lose from these Russian counter-battery strikes?

Well, if we assume at least one Ukrainian soldier died from blast effects and at least one Ukrainian soldier was incapacitated from the blast, then we have 2 Ukrainian soldiers out of action for each Russian strike on 104 artillery units or a total of 208 Ukrainian losses from those strikes.

But we’re not done yet! That artillery paragraph also included the phrase:

manpower and military equipment of the enemy in 128 districts

So again, we have to assume at least one Ukrainian was killed or wounded at each of those strikes on concentrations of manpower and equipment 128 times, thus adding in another 128 casualties. For sake of simplicity in counting, we will assume one KIA in each.

So now we have: 692 + 208 + 128 = 1,028 KIA

But that’s only KIA! Now we have to figure out the WIA. For that, I use the same 1.67 multiplier that I derived from the Ukraine International Institute for Sociology poll that I used in my previous report.

1,028 x 1.67 = 1,717 KIA and WIA

On top of that we an expect a certain number of desertions and prisoners which it is not worth computing based on historical ratios for just one day. Recently reports have suggested that more and more Ukrainian soldiers are surrendering, including entire units up to company size.

The bottom line: Ukraine continues to lose 2,000 soldiers, more or less on average, per day during the current level of fighting. That amounts to SIXTY THOUSAND per month at this rate.

Even if Ukraine still has 700,000 troops under arms as of today, which they almost certainly do not, if this rate continues Ukraine will physically run out of men in about 11-12 months.

But the important point which has to be stressed over and over, because people get bogged down in just the physical numbers, is that what matters is both combat and operational effectiveness. Wikipedia: Combat effectiveness is the capacity or performance of a military force to succeed in undertaking an operation, mission or objective.

The military historian R.F.M. Williams, in reviewing a text on military effectiveness, refers to a four-tier layer of effectiveness:

Political effectiveness refers to a nation’s ability to obtain and allocate resources for military activity. It depends on how legitimate political leaders regard military operations to then allocate national resources to meet military ends. Strategic effectiveness involves the employment of national armed forces to meet national goals. Operational effectiveness is how well a military develops and employs institutional concepts and doctrines to meet strategic objectives within the theater of war. Tactical effectiveness involves the method of fighting to achieve operational objectives. Effectiveness at one level is not enough for success.

This is precisely Ukraine’s problem, or even more precisely, problems. Because Ukraine has problems at every level of the four tiers.

On the political level, Ukraine is having difficulty getting adequate levels of support from NATO. It has also lost massive amounts of resources including both military logistics, transportation logistics, electrical power and industrial capacity.

On the strategic level, Ukraine has set objectives for itself - driving Russia out of eastern Donbass and then out of Crimea - which are physically impossible to achieve.

On the operational level, Ukraine’s doctrines and concepts are failing dramatically in its counteroffensive, partially due to its lack of resources, especially air power and air defenses and partially due to an apparent lack of comprehension on the part of either the military or political leadership of the proper method of conducting a counteroffensive.

On the tactical level, Ukraine clearly is having enormous difficulties even breaching the security zones of the Russian defense lines, let alone the lines themselves, and is almost incapable of capturing and holding more than a hundred meters of front. It’s attacks are limited to platoon or company size attacks and more rarely battalion level. All of them fail and the units of whatever size are forced to retreat with the losses we are describing here.

All of this means that Ukraine has lost military effectiveness on every level of the four tiers. What that means is that Ukraine is no longer capable of doing the two main things required to win a war: 1) seize territory from the enemy, and 2) inflict sufficient losses in men and equipment on the enemy to the level of affecting enemy operations. Instead, it is Russia which is capable of both, especially the latter.

The bottom line of this reality is that Ukraine will lose all operational effectiveness much sooner than they will run out of men and equipment. So even if Ukraine still had 700,000 men under arms - which they don’t - and even if those men were fully equipped to their normal levels of TOE with NATO weapons, it would still not take Russia 11-12 months to defeat Ukraine, as indicated above.

Based on my previous calculations in my earlier article, which showed Ukraine has sustained losses of a minimum of 432,000 to a maximum of 857,000. I estimate that Ukraine has no more than 143,000 to 560,000 men left, most likely closer to the former than the latter.

Do the math. Losing 60,000 men per month means Ukraine will run out of men in a maximum of 9 months and a more probable 3-6 months. But the loss of operational effectiveness will reduce this probably by half, giving us a range of 1.5-3 months.

We will know for sure when this time is reached because we will see Russia beginning to make significant advances, first in specific areas of the front, then on a broad area of the front. Then we will see the front collapsing, first in specific areas, then across the entire front. Russia will likely begin rolling up the front from the ends in order to shorten it which will enable Russia to consolidate its forces into a more focused force. This will enable Russia to direct its more concentrated force against fragmented and weakened Ukrainian units, which will either annihilate those Ukrainian units or force them to retreat.

And as military analysts know, a force in retreat takes even more serious losses in the process. See “Highway of Death.”

That time is coming. Watch for it.