Armageddon in The Middle East - Part 2 - Correlation of Forces and Methods

Correlation of Forces and Methods (COFM) - COFM is defined as the military balance between two opponents at the global, regional, and local levels.

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The Players

Let's start by listing the players and considering the military capabilities of the major players. This list is ordered by the probability of their becoming directly militarily involved in the conflict.

1. Israel

2. United States

3. Hezbollah

4. Yemen

5. Iran

6. Iraq

7. Syria

8. Turkey

9. Russia

10. Pakistan

11. China

12. Remaining West Asian Countries:

    1. Egypt

    2. Jordan

    3. Saudi Arabia

    4. United Arab Emirates

    5. Qatar

    6. Bahrain

We're not including Hamas in this analysis because Hamas' efforts are limited to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Aside from their various rocket attacks inside Israel, which are not particularly militarily effective, Hamas has no ability to project military power outside those two areas. They do not have long-range precision missiles, and their manpower is - so far - limited and restrained by the need to avoid direct large-scale ground engagements against the superior Israeli numbers and military capability. While this situation could change at some point later in the war, it is not likely to be a factor early on, other than Hamas' ability to force Israel to devote a significant proportion of its military force to containing Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. This is important, but not directly relevant to the wider war we are discussing here.

Obviously Israel is the main initiating combatant in this conflict, with the US a close second, since it is widely acknowledged that if the US were not supplying Israel with thousands of tons of ordnance, Israel would be unable to even pursue its campaign against Hamas, let alone prosecute a war against Hezbollah, and further one or more of the regional states.

Hezbollah, Iran, and the Shia and other Islamic militias in Yemen, Iraq and Syria are clearly the other main combatants who have participated and are participating to one degree or another in the initial phase of the conflict.

Iran has only participated - so far - in one incident - retaliating with a carefully calibrated strike using a few hundred older drones (to absorb the Israel and US air defenses) and approximately 7-9 ballistic missiles (which all hit their targets) in retaliation for the Israeli attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. Iran's preferred method of dealing with Israel will be mentioned later. But it is virtually certain that Iran will be directly engaged against Israel, but primarily against the US, as the conflict develops. We will look at its capabilities later.

Yemen, as we all know, participates by firing missiles and drones at ships carrying cargo to Israel and the US Navy ships escorting them, and occasionally a drone or missile fired at targets in Israel. While this has had a major impact on the Israeli economy, it has had little to no serious effect in military terms on Israel's military or civilian population or infrastructure - at least not so far.

The Shia militias in Iraq and Syria participate by firing drones at various Israel targets on occasion - to little major effect - and at US forces in Iraq and Syria with slightly more effect.

Turkey's Erdogan has made noises about getting involved in one manner or another. For now, Turkey's involvement has been mostly noise, with little effort to embargo trade and energy supplies from and through Turkey to Israel.

Russia, China and Pakistan have done nothing in military terms against Israel. Russia's assistance to Iran is purely defensive and will be mentioned later. China has only acted diplomatically so far and I expect will limit its participation to diplomacy in the future.

The rest of the West Asian countries have either done nothing during the conflict but make noises or have cooperated with the United States, including assisting in the downing of some of the Iranian drones used during that strike.

The main immediate antagonist to Israel (and ultimately the US) is Hezbollah, which has been engaged in a carefully calibrated process of escalation beginning almost immediately after October 7, 2023. And it is Hezbollah (in concert with Iran) which presents the possibility of an existential threat to Israel's survival. So we must examine Hezbollah first.

Israel's Military Capabilities

But before dealing with Hezbollah, we should try to estimate the current state of the Israeli military. That is summarized by the Global Firepower Index and is illustrated by this infographic from Al Jazeera:

According to "The Military Balance 2024" issued by the The International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Israeli forces break down as follows (miscellaneous items are ignored - see the book for list of military abbreviations):

AIR DEFENSE
3 bty with Arrow 2/3 ATBM with Green Pine/Super Green Pine radar and Citrus Tree command post
10 bty with Iron Dome (incl reserve bty)
4 bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2
2 bty with David’s Sling

FORCES BY ROLE:

COMMAND
3 (regional comd) corps HQ 1
2 armd div HQ 1
1 (Multidimensional) div HQ 1
5 (territorial) inf div HQ 1
1 (home defence) comd HQ 1

SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bn 1
1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops unit) 1

MANOEUVRE

Armoured
3 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 armd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr
bn)
1 (Multidimensional) armd inf/ISR bn

Mechanised
3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)
1 mech inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn)
1 indep mech inf bn

Light
2 indep inf bn

Air Manoeuvre
1 para bde (3 para bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)

Other
1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn) 1
1 (Border Protection) sy bde (5 ISR bn; 5 sy bn) 1

COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bde 1
1 (special) arty bde 1
1 engr bde (3 engr bn, 3 EOD coy) 1
1 engr bn 1
1 CBRN bn 1
1 int bde (3 int bn) 1
1 int unit 1
1 SIGINT unit 1
2 MP bn 1

Reserves 400,000+ on mobilisation

RESERVE FORCES BY ROLE:

COMMAND
2 armd div HQ
1 AB div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured
9 armd bde
Mechanised
8 mech inf bde

Light
17 (territorial/regional) inf bde

Air Manoeuvre
4 para bde 1

Mountain 1
1 mtn inf bde 1
1 mtn inf bn 1

COMBAT SUPPORT
5 arty bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
6 log unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE:

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT ε400 Merkava MkIV/Mk IV Barak; (ε700 Merkava MkIII; ε200 Merkava MkIV all in store)
APC 790+
APC (T) 790+: ε290 Namer; 500 M113A2; Nagmachon (Centurion chassis); Nakpadon (5,100: ε100 Achzarit (modified T-55 chassis); 5,000 M113A1/A2 all in store)
APC (W) some Eitan
PPV Panter
AUV Tigris; Sand Cat; Ze’ev

ARTILLERY 530
SP 250: 155mm 250 M109A5; (155mm 30 M109A2; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 36 M110 all in store)
TOWED (155mm 171: 40 M-46 mod; 50 M-68/M-71; 81 M-839P/M-845P all in store)
MRL 30: 227mm 30 M270 MLRS; 306mm IMI Lynx
(160mm 50 LAR-160; 227mm 18 M270 MLRS; 290mm 20 LAR-290 all in store)
MOR 250: 81mm 250 (81mm 1,100; 120mm 650; 160mm 18 Soltam M-66 all in store); SP 120mm Khanit

Air FORCES BY ROLE:

FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with F-15A/B/D Eagle (Baz)
1 sqn with F-15B/C/D Eagle (Baz) 1
1 sqn with F-15I Ra’am
5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (Barak) 1
4 sqn with F-16I Fighting Falcon (Sufa) 1
2 sqn with F-35I Adir

ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AH-64A Apache (Peten) 1
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache (Sarat) 1

AIR DEFENCE
3 bty with Arrow 2/3 1
10 bty with Iron Dome
4 bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 1
2 bty with David’s Sling

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2

AIRCRAFT 340 combat capable
FGA 310: 8 F-15A Eagle (Baz); 6 F-15B Eagle (Baz); 17
F-15C Eagle (Baz); 19 F-15D Eagle (Baz); 25 F-15I Ra’am;
ε50 F-16C Fighting Falcon (Barak); 49 F-16D Fighting
Falcon (Barak); 97 F-16I Fighting Falcon (Sufa); 39 F-35I
Adir

HELICOPTERS
ATK 46: 26 AH-64A Apache (Peten); 20 AH-64D Apache
(Sarat)
ASW 7 AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but
with non-rated aircrew)
ISR 12 OH-58B Kiowa
TPT 80: Heavy 25 CH-53D Sea Stallion; Medium 49: 39
S-70A Black Hawk; 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; Light 6 Bell
206 Jet Ranger

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR 3+: Heavy 3+: Heron (Shoval); 3 Heron TP (Eitan);
RQ-5A Hunter; Medium Hermes 450; Hermes 900 (22+ Searcher MkII in store); Light Orbiter 4 (Nitzotz); (an unknown number of ISR UAVs are combat capable)

LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS
Harop; Harpy

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
IRBM • Nuclear ε24 Jericho 2

AIR DEFENCE
SAM 40+:
Long-range M901 Patriot PAC-2
Medium-range some David’s Sling
Short-range up to 40 Iron Dome
Point-defence Machbet

GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan

MISSILE DEFENCE • SAM 24 Arrow 2/Arrow 3

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; Python 4; IIR Python 5; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM 1
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-65 Maverick; Delilah AL; Popeye I/II; Spike NLOS 1

BOMBS
IIR guided Opher
Laser-guided Griffin; Lizard; Paveway II
INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-39 Small
Diameter Bomb (Barad Had); Spice; Spice 2000

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 51:

CORVETTES •
FSGHM 7:
2 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Gabriel V AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM (being upgraded to Barak-8), 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel)
1 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Gabriel V AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel)
4 Magen (Sa’ar 6) with 2 quad lnchr with Gabriel V AShM, 2 20-cell VLS with Tamir (C-Dome) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak LRAD, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 54 LWT (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel)

PCGM 8
Hetz (Sa’ar 4.5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM- 84 Harpoon AShM (can also be fitted with up to 6 single lnchr with Gabriel II AShM), 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, (can be fitted with 2 triple 324mm Mk32 TT with Mk46 LWT), 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CWIS, 1 76mm gun
PBF 36: 5 Shaldag; 2 Shaldag V; 3 Stingray; 9 Super Dvora Mk I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk II (SSM & TT may be fitted); 6 Super Dvora Mk II-I (SSM &
TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk III (SSM & TT may be fitted); 3 Super Dvora Mk III (SSM may be fitted)

SUBMARINES 5
SSK 5:
3 Dolphin (GER HDW design) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/ Kaved HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported)
2 Tanin (GER HDW design) (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/Kaved HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported)

Note: Israel's nuclear weapon capabilities will be discussed later.

Iran's Military Capabilities

Examining Iran's military capabilities requires ignoring Iran's ground forces as they have no logistical capability to project military power on the ground across the intervening states against Israel. What they do have is an estimated 3,000 missiles (according to the "The Military Balance 2024"), a portion of which have the capability to hit Israel. More on that below.

They also have an ability to absolutely deny the United States any chance of a ground invasion into Iran. It is this:

Basij Resistance Force
ε600,000 on mobilisation
Paramilitary militia with claimed membership of 12.6 million; ε600,000 combat capable

Any ground invasion of Iran - by anyone - would be a suicide mission, short of using massed tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. They would be facing a possible 12-13 million man militia - highly motivated militia.

I will also ignore Iran's Air Force, which is mostly composed of older aircraft which will be little to no match for Israeli or US Air Force modern jet fighters. However, depending on the quality of training of Iran's pilots, its Air Force may be capable, used in conjunction with its extensive air defense missile capability, to score some tactical successes against an Israeli or US air campaign, according to articles here (archived) and here.

While Iran is reportedly buying 24 new Russian SU-35 jets, reports of imminent delivery have been denied by Russia and Iran. There is also the issue of training Iranian pilots to effectively use these new, much more sophisticated jets. Training a combat pilot to use planes like these effectively in combat can take years. So it is unlikely that these jets will be of much immediate use in the near future - unless, of course, Russia allows its own pilots to crew them, which I view as unlikely.

Iran's Overall Strategy

Iran's overall strategy with regard to Israel and the US is based on several principles:

1. Strategic patience – keeping conflicts away from its borders.

2. Use of regional non-state actors as proxies.

3. Diplomacy and "soft power".

4. Active deterrence - long military preparation and regional non-state allies.

5. Strategic missile defense - see below.

6. Strategic partners - Russia and China.

7. Economic and population superiority: oil and gas, 85 million educated people, and extensive agricultural and manufacturing bases.

8. As noted above, an enormous reserve militia force next to a formidable and motivated regular military as well as the even more motivated Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

9. Asymmetric maritime capabilities - warships, submarines, mines (largest mine inventory in the region), anti-ship missiles, etc.

Iran's Missile Arsenal

More directly, as noted above, Iran's ability to project military power against Israel and United States facilities in the region relies on its missile arsenal some of which is shown below.

Iran Watch - Table of Iran's Missile Arsenal - February 22, 2024

Further details of the missile listed above can be found in the United Institute of Peace Iran Primer article and in The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) report "Open Source Analysis of Iran's Missile and UAV Capabilities and Proliferation" (PDF download).

The mistake many people make is see the figure of "3,000 missiles" and assume Iran can drop 3,000 ballistic missiles on Israel. This is not the case. You have to count the estimated number of each missile which has the range which enables the missile to actually hit Israel from Iran. The shortest distance between Iran and Tel Aviv (as a likely primary target) is over 1,700km or approximately 1,000 miles. As you can see from the table above, only 7-9 Iranian ballistic missiles have the capability to hit Israel. Some of them may have longer ranges if fitted with a lighter payload than the maximum they are designed to carry. Some of them may not be fully operational or have not yet been produced in sufficient numbers to be a major threat. Since this information is classified, we can only consider rough estimates as provided by various open sources.

I'd also like to point out that the often-quoted figure of "3,000 Iranian ballistic missiles of all types" - usually quoted word-for-word - is sourced to one sentence in testimony given by General Kenneth McKenzie, Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command, March 15, 2022. He did not break out that figure into any specific designation of missile systems or ranges in his testimony, nor did his prepared written statement. So the figure is essentially meaningless! What he did say was: "Some of which can reach Tel Aviv to give you an idea of range."

There is also the issue of production rates. Just because a missile has been tested or approved for deployment one year does not mean enough missiles to be useful are being produced on an annual basis. Many of these missiles which have the range to hit Israel are larger more advanced missiles which were brought into production only in the last five or six years. So it depends entirely on the rate of production which requires ramping up the industrial production facilities, ramping up the production lines, establishing a quality assurance program, etc. and then actually storing or deploying the weapons as well as training the crews to operate them. There is also the necessity for many of these missiles to produce launchers for the missile. This is probably easier as they are basically more or less simplistic military vehicles with a ramp or elevator on it to hold the missile. But you also need the production of the liquid or solid fuel, which requires more production facilities, depending on the ability to engineer those facilities. There's also the manufacture of the electronic components to insure the missile has some precision capability, and many times this is hampered by sanctions on the Iranian economy by the US and EU (although probably offset to a large degree by China.)

The bottom line: estimates of Iran's capability to hit Israel with highly capable ballistic missiles from open source or even government sources are highly suspect, at best.

I had at one time a source that I can not find now that had some estimated figures for production of various versions of Iran's missiles. Based on those figures at that time, I estimated that the maximum estimated number of missiles that could hit Israel was no more than 500-750.

The earliest missile with the necessary range was the Shahab-3 (variants 4 and 5 and Ghadr), allegedly produced 12-15 per year since 1998, or about 375 missiles. Most of them were allegedly converted to the longer-range Ghadr version, so I'm counting all of them as having adequate range to hit Israel.

The Emad, another Shahab-3 variant, only went into service in 2015, so I don't expect there are too many of those in service. Assuming the same rate of production as the Shabab, that gives us 150 of those.

The Khorramshahr only went into service in 2017, so ditto. It's status might actually still be "in development." Assuming it's in production at the same rate, that gives us 90 of those.

The Sejjil-2's status is uncertain. First tested in 2008 and 2009, then nothing until 2021 when it was tested again. Assuming its in production since 2009 would give us 210 max, but it's probably less.

Adding all these up gives us 845, but I would guess the figure is closer to 750 or even 500. So out of 3,000 Iranian missiles, only 750 or less can hit Israel. A nice number but it's not clear that all of them would be used against Israel if Iran is fighting the US at the same time. Iran would be better advised to hit US bases in the Gulf Region and in Turkey.

And finally, there is the question: how many launchers does Iran have? IISS has said:

Iran has up to 50 medium range ballistic missile launchers and up to 100 short range ballistic missile launchers, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a UK-based think tank.

They have recently updated that to estimate 180 launchers. See the hypersonic missile article referenced below. Whether these figures are accurate is anyone's guess.

Iran's "Hypersonic" Missile

People have been referring to Iran - and even Ansar Allah - having possession of new "hypersonic" missiles. This appears to be a misnomer for several reasons.

First, most ballistic missiles are "hypersonic" in the sense that they travel faster than 5 times the speed of sound. As the Center for Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation Fact Sheet points out, many ballistic missiles travel at that speed.

What differentiates today’s emerging class of hypersonic capabilities is the use of aerodynamic lift to allow reentry vehicles to maneuver under guided flight within the atmosphere.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies article "Removing the hype from Iran’s ‘hypersonic’ conqueror" :

Many surface-to-surface missiles achieve speeds within the atmosphere that cross the hypersonic threshold, that is greater than Mach 5. It is not speed alone that distinguishes the two main types of weapons known as hypersonic weapons – hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs) – but also the ability to manoeuvre significantly during atmospheric flight, including at considerable cross-range.  

Fattah is neither of these two classes of weapon, but a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Still, its development appears to be aimed at achieving endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric manoeuvrability to provide Iran with a more accurate and survivable missile.

So the bottom line is: the two new Iranian missiles - the Fattah MRBM and the Khorramshahr-4 MRBM - have some atmospheric maneuverability, but the extent of it is not certain. They are thus not directly comparable to the Russian Zircon or Kinzhal missiles. Nonetheless, they do add more formidable evasion capabilities than previous Iranian missiles.

Update: As I type this, it is reported that Ansar Allah in Yemen fired a ballistic missile - not a drone - into Tel Aviv. The missile traveled 2,040km in 11.5 minutes, for a speed of Mach 8.62. So that missile was definitely supersonic. It also evaded 20 Israeli air defense missiles (although Israel claimed it was hit and fragmented in the air.) This was presumably a Fattah MRBM as noted above.

Iran's Drone Capabilities

Of course at least 5-7 types of Iranian drones can travel to Israel as demonstrated on April 13, 2024. JINSA (Jewish Institute for National Security of America) published this map of Iranian drone ranges (PDF download):

Drones are likely easier to produce than large ballistic missiles, but production rates of these are also unknown. Clearly, however, Iran has enough to expend perhaps 300 of them just to distract Israeli air defenses during their April retaliation strike. The Russians are able to produce the Shahed-136 at the rate of at least 6,000 a year. Iran's production rate is unknown. Other drones are produced at lower rates in Iran, according to Wikipedia. Like the long-range ballistic missiles, most of the longer range drones were only introduced from 2014-2021, so large numbers are unlikely depending on the difficulty of production.

Most of Iran's missile and drone systems are intended to be used against enemies in the immediate vicinity of Iran - specifically, countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asia 'stans - and US military facilities in the region. So the vast majority of Iranian missile and drones are shorter range, from 200-700km. And Iran does have a lot of them, even if the exact number is unknown.

This is going to be a real problem for the United States military facilities in the region which would be the US' primary forward military assets in any war with Iran. The primary mode of attack by the US is going to be by the air: bombers, fighter-bombers, and cruise missiles, whether launched from regional ground bases or from naval assets in the region (some long-range bombers can fly directly from Europe or even the US.) If the airfields are bombed by Iran, and the ships are sunk with anti-ship missiles, the US is going to find it difficult to seriously damage Iranian military capabilities sufficiently to prevent Iran from launching at least some of those 500-800+ long-range ballistic missiles against Israel.

Iran's "Missile Cities"

Equally important to Iran's missile arsenal is its protection of that arsenal. Iran is widely believed and has explicitly stated that a large portion of that arsenal is stored and deployed in massive underground "missile cities" constructed probably with means provided by North Korea, which has extensive underground facilities. Iranian state media has more than once issued video evidence of the existence of these facilities, which are scattered around the country.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published an analysis of one such base in May, 2021. And the National Council of Resistance of Iran (A.K.A. the The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)) published details of two Iranian missile bases in March, 2021.

Alastair Crooke has pointed out on several occasions "...Iran has dispersed and buried its ballistic missile silos across the entire terrain of Iran under the control of autonomous units which are capable of continuing a war, even were central command and communications to be completely lost."

Let us turn now to Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's Military Capabilities

Hezbollah's assets are listed by "The Military Balance" as follows:

Hizbullah 20,000 (plus ε30,000 reserves)
(Note: Hezbollah claims at least 100,000 including reserves)

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-54/55; T-72 (all in Syria)
APC • APC (T) M113; MT-LB (all in Syria)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (RS-AT-13); Dehlavieh (Kornet); Milan

ARTILLERY
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvodzika (in Syria) 1
TOWED 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46 (all in Syria) 1 MRL 122mm BM-21; 240mm Fadjr 3; 300mm Fadjr 5 1

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional Fateh-110; M-600; SS-1D Scud C (reported); SS-1E Scud D (reported); Zelzal 2

COASTAL DEFENCE
• AShM C-802 (Noor) (anti-ship missile)

UNIHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Light Mersad
ISR • Medium Sammad 1; Ababil 2; Light Mohajer 2 1

LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS
Ababil T (Mersad 1)

AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence Misaq-2 (QW-18) 1
GUN • SP 57mm ZSU-57-2; 85mm KS-12 mod (on 2P25 chassis); 100mm KS-19 mod (on 2P25 chassis) (all in Syria) 1

Two other aspects of Hezbollah's armaments should be mentioned. First is Iran's Precision Missile Project, which is a project intended to increase the targeting precision of Hezbollah's older missiles in lieu of physically transporting entire missiles to Lebanon. This project is analyzed in a report by the Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM) called "BICOM Briefing | Hezbollah’s Precision Missile Project – October 2019 Update", which is available as a PDF download.

The Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) also published an article on this project called Deadly Precision on Feb 27, 2019.

The article describes the purpose of the project as follows:

How do GPS precision-guided missiles work?

• The Fateh 110 and its variants – including the newly upgraded precision missiles – guide themselves to their target using an ‘inertial’ guidance system. The relevant coordinates are pre-programmed into the missile’s computer via a laptop. The missile is fitted with a GPS system as well as accelerometers (motion sensors) and gyroscopes (rotation sensors) which allow the missile to continuously determine its location and velocity (speed and direction).

• The guidance system steers the missile onto the correct path by rotating fins or canards on the outer casing. The solid fuel engine of the missile powers it for around 30 seconds before it continues its flight through inertia. Corrections to its trajectory can continue to be made until its impact at the specified target.

What does the upgrading process involve?

• Iran and Hezbollah are attempting to upgrade Hezbollah’s existing Zelzal-2 unguided missiles with similar guidance technology to that found in the Fateh-110. The two missiles have similar weight (around 3,500kg) and dimensions (8.5m length, 610mm diameter). The upgrading process requires removing an existing section of the Zelzal 2 and replacing it with a new section which has the following components fitted:

1. GPS-type navigation system (for tracking the current location of the missile), using either American GPS systems or a Russian Glonass system.

2. Command and guidance system (for directing the missile towards the target using navigation data and target information).

3. Control system (for applying guidance commands and steering the missile).

4. On the outside, small winglets or canards, which can help the missile change direction once in flight.

This process can apparently be done in as little as 2-3 hours at a cost of $5-10,000, although it requires trained technicians.

In addition to the newly upgraded precision missiles, an article in Forbes discusses the threat to both the Israeli Navy and the US Navy from Hezbollah's alleged possession of a serious Russian anti-ship missile called the "Yakhont", also known as the P-800 Oniks.

Hezbollah possesses another anti-ship missile of even greater concern to Israel - the Yakhont which was developed by Russia in the 1990s. Ground, air or submarine-launched, the Yakhont has a 186-mile (300 km) range while carrying either a 440-pound (200 kg) high explosive or 550-pound (250 kg) semi-armor piercing warhead. The basic Yakhont has inertial navigation-based guidance so it can circumvent GPS jamming. The CSIS report says Russia delivered 72 Yakhont missiles to Syria in 2011, along with 18 launch-vehicles. Shipments of more advanced, radar-equipped variants followed in May 2013. Syria is reported to have transferred a number of those systems to Hezbollah. As of January 2016, U.S. intelligence estimated that Hezbollah had up to 12 Yakhonts, possibly operated with Iranian assistance.

Hezbollah Drone Capabilities

A second aspect is Hezbollah's drone capabilities.

The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) produced a report on this subject in July entitled "Hezbollah's New Drone Threats to Israel (PDF Download)".

Hezbollah’s arsenal of drones reportedly numbers at least 2,000. The Iran-backed terror group has primarily deployed Ababil-model one-way attack drones, particularly the Ababil-T, in its attacks on Israel. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has also asserted that the group can indigenously manufacture drones, suggesting an ability to continue replenishing this formidable arsenal.

Hezbollah’s drones’ ability to maneuver in different directions, at an unpredictable trajectory, and at a range of speeds all present further obstacles to interception.

The Iron Dome system is calibrated to intercept projectiles along an anticipated trajectory, making interception of Hezbollah’s drones—which, unlike rockets and missiles, lack a predictable flight path—a tactical challenge. These drones further complicate interception by flying at slower speeds than Israeli fighter aircraft.

As a result, combat helicopters have reportedly proven to be Israel’s best tool for intercepting drones because of their maneuverability. In addition, helicopters can likely provide aerial reconnaissance to help distinguish drones from false positives.

The problem with that solution, of course, is that low-flying helicopters are very susceptible to anti-aircraft missiles, including from man-portable air defense systems with which Hezbollah is very well supplied.

An additional capability was recently revealed: that Hezbollah has drones capable of firing missiles. See this article and this article. The drone carried two missiles as well as having a warhead itself. Reportedly this is a capability that Hezbollah developed since 2014 in the Syrian civil war.

Even more dangerous is the Saqr Iranian 358 loitering missile which can target aerial targets instead of ground or vehicle targets and has allegedly been supplied to Hezbollah by Iran. Hezbollah reportedly used this missile to shoot down an Israeli drone. It is the same type of missile which Ansar Allah (the "Houthis") used to shoot down a US Reaper drone. The missile is fired over a battlefield where it scans the area for potential targets. Allegedly it is not useful against high-speed fighter jets. However, as I mentioned above, Israeli helicopters would be easy prey for this missile if Israel were to use them to shoot down other types of Hezbollah drones.

And finally, there are reports that Iran is considering sending Hezbollah more serious air defense systems capable of dealing with Israel's - and by extension, the US Air Force's - jets. According to this article from Army Recognition Group, a defense news Web site:

Iran has developed several missile systems capable of targeting Israeli fighter jets, each designed to counter different types of aircraft used by the Israeli Air Force. To date, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) operates some of the world's most advanced fighter jets, including the F-35I Adir, F-15I Ra'am, and F-16I Sufa, each based on a well-known US fighter jet...

Hezbollah sources revealed that the group is preparing significant actions against Israel, involving the use of long-range precision missiles and surface-to-air missiles capable of targeting Israeli warplanes. The missile, originally Russian-made and modified with Iranian technology, is expected to be tested. Successful deployment of this missile could impact Israel significantly, similar to previous instances where Hezbollah downed Israeli drones.

Hezbollah Military Capabilities

Looking at Hezbollah's list of armaments doesn't tell us enough about its true military capabilities. To begin with, we should look at Hezbollah's performance in the 2006 conflict with Israel. The best reference for that is Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry's Asia Times 3-part series, "How Hezbollah Defeated Israel". Asia Times appears to be defunct today, but Part 1 can be found at the Counterpunch Web site, and all three parts were reprinted at the AlahedNews Web site in Lebanon.

Crook and Perry's conclusions were straightforward:

Our overall conclusion contradicts the current point of view being retailed by some White House and "Israeli" officials: that "Israel's" offensive in Lebanon significantly damaged Hezbollah's ability to wage war, that "Israel" successfully degraded Hezbollah's military ability to prevail in a future conflict, and that the "Israel" Defense Forces (IDF), once deployed in large numbers in southern Lebanon, were able to prevail over their foes and dictate a settlement favorable to the "Israeli" political establishment.

Just the opposite is true. From the onset of the conflict to its last operations, Hezbollah commanders successfully penetrated "Israel's" strategic and tactical decision-making cycle across a spectrum of intelligence, military and political operations, with the result that Hezbollah scored a decisive and complete victory in its war with "Israel".

Further, Crooke and Perry discussed Hezbollah's preparations for war with Israel which had been ongoing for years subsequent to Israel's being forced to leave Lebanon by Hezbollah:

Hezbollah's robust and hardened defenses were the result of six years of diligent work, beginning with the "Israeli" withdrawal from the region in 2000. Many of the command bunkers designed and built by Hezbollah engineers were fortified, and a few were even air-conditioned.

The digging of the arsenals over the previous years had been accompanied by a program of deception, with some bunkers being constructed in the open and often under the eyes of "Israeli" drone vehicles or under the observation of Lebanese citizens with close ties to the "Israeli"s. With few exceptions, these bunkers were decoys. The building of other bunkers went forward in areas kept hidden from the Lebanese population. The most important command bunkers and weapons-arsenal bunkers were dug deeply into Lebanon's rocky hills - to a depth of 40 meters. Nearly 600 separate ammunition and weapons bunkers were strategically placed in the region south of the Litani.

For security reasons, no single commander knew the location of each bunker and each distinct Hezbollah militia unit was assigned access to three bunkers only - a primary munitions bunker and two reserve bunkers, in case the primary bunker was destroyed. Separate primary and backup marshaling points were also designated for distinct combat units, which were tasked to arm and fight within specific combat areas. The security protocols for the marshaling of troops was diligently maintained. No single Hezbollah member had knowledge of the militia's entire bunker structure.

Hezbollah's primary arsenals and marshaling points were targeted by the "Israeli" Air Force (IAF) in the first 72 hours of the war. "Israel's" commanders had identified these bunkers through a mix of intelligence reports - signals intercepts from Hezbollah communications, satellite-reconnaissance photos gleaned from cooperative arrangements with the US military, photos analyzed as a result of IAF overflights of the region, photos from drone aircraft deployed over southern Lebanon and, most important, a network of trusted human-intelligence sources recruited by "Israeli" intelligence officers living in southern Lebanon, including a large number of foreign (non-Lebanese) nationals registered as guest workers in the country.

The initial attack on Hezbollah's marshaling points and major bunker complexes, which took place in the first 72 hours of the war, failed. On July 15, the IAF targeted Hezbollah's leadership in Beirut. This attack also failed. At no point during the war was any major Hezbollah political figure killed, despite "Israel's" constant insistence that the organization's senior leadership had suffered losses.

According to one US official who observed the war closely, the IAF's air offensive degraded "perhaps only 7%" of the total military resource assets available to Hezbollah's fighters in the first three days of fighting and added that, in his opinion, "Israeli" air attacks on the Hezbollah leadership were "absolutely futile".

Discussion of the ground war in Part 2 of the series is even more enlightening:

The difference between "pushing" out a force and invading and occupying a town was thereby set, another clear signal to US military experts that the IDF could enter a town but could not occupy it. One US officer schooled in US military history compared the IDF's foray into southern Lebanon to Robert E Lee's bloody attack on Union positions at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, during the American Civil War. "Oh I can get there, all right," Lee's lieutenant said during that war, "it's staying there that's the problem."

After-battle reports of Hezbollah commanders now confirm that IDF troops never fully secured the border area and Maroun al-Ras was never fully taken. Nor did Hezbollah ever feel the need to call up its reserves, as "Israel" had done. "The entire war was fought by one Hezbollah brigade of 3,000 troops, and no more," one military expert in the region said. "The Nasr Brigade fought the entire war. Hezbollah never felt the need to reinforce it."

Reports from Lebanon underscore this point. Much to their surprise, Hezbollah commanders found that "Israeli" troops were poorly organized and disciplined. The only "Israeli" unit that performed up to standards was the Golani Brigade, according to Lebanese observers. The IDF was "a motley assortment", one official with a deep knowledge of US slang reported. "But that's what happens when you have spent four decades firing rubber bullets at women and children in the West Bank and Gaza."

IDF commanders were also disturbed by the performance of their troops, noting a signal lack of discipline even among its best-trained regular soldiers. The reserves were worse, and IDF commanders hesitated to put them into battle.

And it got worse...

"There is a common misperception that the US Air Force was thrilled by the "Israeli" war against Lebanon," one Middle East expert with access to senior Pentagon officials told us. "They were aghast. They well know the limits of their own power and they know how it can be abused.

"It seemed to them (USAF officers) that "Israel" threw away the book in Lebanon. This wasn't surgical, it wasn't precise, and it certainly wasn't smart. You can't just coat a country in iron and hope to win."

The cold, harsh numbers of the war point up the fallacy of the "Israeli" air and ground campaign. Hezbollah had secreted upwards of 18,000 rockets in its arsenals prior to the conflict. These sites were hardened against "Israeli" air strikes and easily survived the air campaign. Hezbollah officials calculated that from the time of firing until the IAF was able to identify and deploy fighters to take out the mobile rockets was 90 seconds. Through years of diligent training, Hezbollah rocket teams had learned to deploy, fire and safely cover their mobile launchers in less than 60 seconds, with the result that IAF planes and helicopters (which "Israel" has in much fewer numbers than it boasts) could not stop Hezbollah's continued rocket fire at "Israel" (""Israel" is about three helicopters away from a total disaster," one US military officer commented).

Hezbollah fired about 4,000 rockets at "Israel" (a more precise, though uncertain, figure calculates the firing of 4,180 rockets), bringing its stockpiles down to 14,000 rockets - enough to prosecute the war for at least three more months.

Moreover, and more significant, Hezbollah's fighters proved to be dedicated and disciplined. Using intelligence assets to pinpoint "Israeli" infantry penetrations, they proved the equal of "Israel"'s best fighting units. In some cases, "Israeli" units were defeated on the field of battle, forced into sudden retreats or forced to rely on air cover to save elements from being overrun. Even toward the end of the war, on August 9, the IDF announced that 15 of its reserve soldiers were killed and 40 wounded in fighting in the villages of Marjayoun, Khiam and Kila - a stunning casualty rate for a marginal piece of real estate.

The robust Hezbollah defense was also taking its toll on "Israeli" armor. When "Israel" finally agreed to a ceasefire and began its withdrawal from the border area, it left behind upwards of 40 armored vehicles, nearly all of them destroyed by expertly deployed AT-3 "Sagger" anti-tank missiles - which is the NATO name for the Russian-made vehicle- or man-deployed, wire-guided, second-generation 9M14 Malyutka - or "Little Baby".

With a range of 3 kilometers, the Sagger proved enormously successful in taking on "Israeli" tanks, a fact that must have given "Israeli" armor commanders fits, in large part because the Sagger missile deployed by Hezbollah is an older version (developed and deployed in 1973) of a more modern version that is more easily hidden and deployed and has a larger warhead. If the IDF could not protect its armor against the 1973 "second generation" version, IDF commanders must now be wondering how it can possibly protect itself against a version that is more modern, more sophisticated, and more deadly.

In a publication by the US Air Force Air University entitled "Divining Victory - Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War"by William Arkin, which analyzed Israeli use of its air assets in the conflict, a similar conclusion was drawn:

Arguing that Israel achieved what it set forth to achieve in the 2006 war, however, is a little like saying that the operation was successful but the patient died. The performance of airpower may have been superb, and the IDF may have indeed accomplished difficult internal transformational tasks under fire, but in terms of Israel’s objectives, the kidnapped Israeli soldiers were neither rescued nor released; Hezbollah rocket fire was never suppressed, not even its long-range fire; the extent of Israeli attacks evoked widespread condemnation; and Israeli ground forces were badly shaken and bogged down by a well-equipped and capable foe. Even General Halutz labels the war results “mediocre” and admits that the IDF did not achieve its internal objectives. Great damage may have been done to Hezbollah by Israeli bombardment—air, sea, and land—but nothing Israel did was able to undermine its basic coherence or deplete its forces. Barely a month after the cease-fire, Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah still had at least 20,000 rockets.

I suggest that we can confidently expect the current Hezbollah combat capability is greater than in 2006 and that the current Israeli combat capability is even less than 2006, and are further exacerbated by the last 11 months of war in Gaza and in northern Israel.

The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University, a conservative Israeli think tank, issued a report to the Israeli government recently based on a three-year study by over 100 experts which outlined the probable impact of a current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. I could not locate the report at the organization's Web site, which indicates that although its conclusions were leaked to the press the report itself is classified.

The conclusions were described as "chilling" in Israeli press media:

Israel’s war from the north will begin with a massive and destructive barrage of Hezbollah rockets nearly all across the country. The rocket fire will be intense, ranging from 2,500 to 3,000 launches per day, including less accurate rockets and precise long-range missiles. Periodically, Hezbollah will concentrate its efforts, launching massive barrages towards a single target area: a major IDF base or a city in the densely populated center of the country, which will be subjected to hundreds of daily rockets. The barrage will continue day after day until the end of the war, likely three weeks after its outbreak.

In the early stages of the conflict, terror organizations, all Iranian proxies, from across the region will join Hezbollah - Pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen. Beyond causing immense destruction in Israel, including thousands of casualties on both the frontlines and the home front, causing public panic, a central objective of the multi-front attack will be to collapse the IDF's air defense systems. Precision-guided munitions and low-signature weapons, such as loitering munitions, drones, and standoff missiles, will attempt to physically strike and destroy Iron Dome batteries.

The rate of fire will challenge Israeli technology like never before. The stockpiles of Iron Dome interceptors and David's Sling missiles will be depleted within a few days of the fighting, leaving Israel exposed to thousands of rockets and missiles without effective active defense. At the same time, Hezbollah will attempt to disrupt the air force and limit its ability to operate from its bases. Heavy and precise missiles will be directed towards takeoff routes at intervals, preventing or hindering their recovery. Indiscriminate fire will be directed towards hangars storing F-16, F-35, and F-15 planes, which make up the bulk of Israel's main air power.

Precise missiles with hundreds of kilograms of explosive warheads, including cruise missiles, will be aimed at critical infrastructure including power plants, electricity infrastructure, and water desalination and transmission facilities. The seaports of Haifa and Ashdod will be paralyzed, impacting international trade. Dozens of Iranian-made suicide drones will fly at very low altitudes towards high-quality targets deep within Israel, directed at weapon factories, IDF emergency warehouses, and hospitals, which will be overwhelmed with casualties beyond what medical teams can handle, far more than even after October 7.

Missile attacks are only one part of the attack; vital transportation infrastructure, communications, government offices, and local authorities' sites will be targets for widespread cyber-attacks, posing a serious threat to the functioning of the economy. Traffic flow will become difficult and hazardous as the traffic light control systems collapse and the raining of missiles everywhere. Chaos will intensify when Hezbollah sends hundreds of Radwan commandos to seize towns and villages, and IDF posts along the Lebanese border. The IDF will have to fight within Israeli territory, diverting efforts from operations on the ground in Lebanon to take control of launch areas.

On the home front, the public will struggle to receive timely and reliable information about the situation, and lose trust in official sources and spokespeople. Anxiety and panic will mount with the large number of casualties, massive damage, power and water supply disruptions, delays in rescue and relief forces to destruction zones, and difficulties in accessing essential services such as food and medicine. Public anxiety and confusion will be exacerbated by Hezbollah's relentless psychological warfare, flooding mainstream and social media with a disinformation campaign, deepening internal divisions. Those seeking refuge abroad will find that all flights have been canceled.

Throughout the conflict, Hezbollah will start fires in every possible arena, through incitement, encouragement of an uprising in the West Bank and among Israel's Arab citizens, to stretch as many military and police forces as possible to maintain public order. After about three weeks of fire and blood, the unprecedented scale of damage in Lebanon and Israel will lead to the end of the conflict in a stalemate, amid pressure from the international community. Even in the final hours of the war, Hezbollah will continue to rain down missiles and rockets on the home front, according to a systematic plan, while activating launchers from deep within Lebanese territory prepared in advance....

The report pays special attention to IDF ground forces and their ground maneuvering capabilities in multiple and simultaneous theaters of war. When they begin to maneuver, ground forces will encounter dense Hezbollah defense systems, well-armed and ready for combat, and many anti-tank teams. Even in an optimal situation where armor columns and infantry forces penetrate deep into Lebanon to take control of launch areas, the maneuver may prove to be irrelevant. The heavy fire on the home front will continue because Hezbollah can conduct distributed combat operations from many areas, which are capable of acting independently.

Further details of Hezbollah's capabilities can be read in the 2022 book "Hezbollah: A Regional Armed Non-state Actor", Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, by Hadi Wahab, which is available for free download here.

Another vital article which should be read is Wikipedia's massive "Hezbollah armed strength" which covers many of Hezbollah's capabilities in 2006, in the Syria civil war, and subsequently.

Another article worth perusing is The WarZone's "This Is Hezbollah’s Arsenal Of Weapons It Could Rain On Israel."

As we discussed above, in the same way that Iran has used North Korean underground construction technology to protect its missile arsenal, Hezbollah has also done so, as The WarZone's article "Hezbollah Touts Rocket Cave Network Capable Of Underground Launches" shows. This is also discussed in a Times of Israel article, "Expert: Hezbollah has built a vast tunnel network far more sophisticated than Hamas’s" as well as an Alma Research and Education Center study entitled "Hezbollah’s “Land of Tunnels” – the North Korean-Iranian Connection".

A few weeks ago, Hezbollah released a video of their "IMAD-4" underground missile base which you can view on Youtube here.

The bottom line: Forget about regarding Hezbollah as a bunch of sandal-wearing guerrillas with AK's and RPGs. They are undoubtedly the most powerful, well-trained and experienced armed non-state actor in the world. Directly comparing their numbers and weapons with Israel's military and weapons and concluding that Hezbollah can not defeat Israel would be a serious mistake.

How a conflict between Hezbollah and Israel may play out will be discussed in part 3 of this series.

With regard to the other potential or actual participants in the upcoming Middle East conflict - Yemen, Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, and the Syrian and Iraqi states themselves - I'm going to mostly ignore those in this article of the series. I may reference them in the upcoming articles insofar as they may apply to the development and expansion of the conflict into other theaters in the region. For the most part, however, they are not likely to be immediately effective components compared to Hezbollah and Iran.

So the next article in this series will discuss how the conflict might - I stress might - play out starting from the most likely scenario of an initial Israeli incursion/invasion into Lebanon.