Another Less-Than-Short Ukrainian Interlude...

Wherein I explain how I calculate Ukrainian losses and estimate the remaining length of the war...

Let's look at today's Russian Ministry of Defense "clobber list" and see if we can come to an estimate of Ukraine's current rate of losses. We will omit the statements describing various Ukraine and Russian operations. We also assume that "enemy losses" primarily refers to "killed" and not "wounded."

"The enemy losses were up to 320 Ukrainian servicemen, two armoured fighting vehicles, three motor vehicles, one U.S.-manufactured M777 artillery system, one Polish-manufactured Krab self-propelled artillery system, one Msta-B howitzer, two Rapira anti-tank guns, and one U.S.-manufactured AN/TPQ-50 counter-battery radar station."

"The enemy losses were up to 60 Ukrainian servicemen, two armoured fighting vehicles, four motor vehicles, one U.S.-manufactured M777 artillery system, and one D-30 howitzer."

"The enemy losses were up to 240 Ukrainian servicemen, two armoured fighting vehicles, two motor vehicles, one U.S.-manufactured M109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system, three Msta-B howitzers, one Akatsiya self-propelled artillery system, and one D-30 howitzer."

"The enemy losses were up to 35 Ukrainian servicemen, four armoured fighting vehicles, two motor vehicles, one D-20 howitzer, and one Gvozdika self-propelled artillery system."

In Kherson direction, the enemy losses were up to 40 Ukrainian servicemen, eight motor vehicles, one Verba multiple-launch rocket system and one Akatsiya self-propelled artillery system.

"Operational-Tactical and Army aviation, Missile Troops and Artillery of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have neutralised 73 AFU artillery units at their firing positions, manpower and hardware in 68 areas."

We assume that at least one Ukrainian soldiers was standing in these strike areas and was either killed or wounded. An "artillery unit" could refer to either a battery or a single artillery piece. One artillery piece usually has at least two or three soldiers in its immediate vicinity, who could be killed or wounded if the unit is struck. So we can assume at least one Ukrainian was killed in such attacks, and others were possibly wounded.

So we have the following calculation for Ukrainian personnel losses:

320 + 60 + 240 + 35 + 40 + 73 (artillery soldiers) + 68 (manpower concentrations).

This gives us a total of 836 Ukrainians killed in one day.

In military history, the ratio of killed to wounded varies from 1:1 (and sometimes even less) to 1:4, i.e., for every one killed, 1-4 are wounded.

A survey done by an Ukrainian sociology institute determined that at least 78% of Ukrainian families have suffered at least one death or wounding of a family member. The median average per family was 3 killed and up to 5 wounded.

Most Ukrainians have relatives or friends injured or killed in Russian invasion of Ukraine

The original press release from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology is here.

Here is the relevant extract of their report:

"The absolute majority of Ukrainians - 78% - have close relatives or friends who were injured or killed due to the Russian invasion. Among those who have such close relatives or friends, the average number (the median value was used) was 7. That is, on average, such respondents have 7 close relatives or friends who were injured or killed.

Herewith:

- 64% of Ukrainians have at least one close relative or friend who was injured (on average, have 5 injured close people),

- and 63% have at least one close relative or friend who died (on average they have 3 deceased loved ones)."

If we take this description to indicate a ratio of killed to wounded to be 3:5, that translates to a ratio of 1:1.67 killed to wounded.

So if we take our figure of 836 Ukrainians killed and multiply by 1.67, we get a total of wounded Ukrainians which is 1,396 (rounded down).

We add this figure to the total killed to get the total of Ukrainians soldiers removed from the battlefield as "effectives": 2,232.

On July 11, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu stated that Ukraine had lost 26,000 soldiers during its current "offensive", which started around June 4th. So from June 4th to July 11 is 38 days.

If we take the daily total of Ukrainians killed to be around 800 and multiply it by 38, we get 30,400 - which is only 4,000 more than what Shoigu claimed. To be fair, we don't know if Shoigu was counting only Ukrainians killed in his figure, or both killed and wounded. If the latter, it would cast doubt on our calculation as if we added in the wounded to the killed figure times 38, we get a much bigger number: 84,816. But if we assume he was referring only to Ukrainians killed, as the Russians generally have not referred to Ukrainian wounded in any of their reports, then his number pretty much agrees with our calculation.

I have been using this method of computing Ukrainian casualties since the start of the war. The key point is to take the number of Ukrainians "losses" - which in the Russian MoD reports means "killed" - and then multiply them by an estimated ratio of wounded, anywhere from 1:1 to 1:4 (historically the average is 1:3). You then add the number of wounded to the number killed and this represents the number of "effectives" removed from the battlefield.

Since the beginning of the war, I have been estimating Ukraine's total losses per month, using this method, at between 15-30,000 per month, using a ratio range of 1:1 to 1:2.

If we use the 15-30,000/month figure for the last 18 months, Ukrainian losses at a 1:1 ration would be approximately 270,000 and at 1:2 ratio they would be 540,000.

However, I believe that the rate of Ukrainian losses began to increase last fall during their Kharkiv and Kherson offensives, and either continued or escalated again during the fight for Bakhmut, when Ukraine repeatedly sent in reinforcements to try to hold Bakhmut and suffered according to reports at least 14,000 losses of personnel in that fight.

The principle is that the more intense the fighting, that is, the increase in the number of forces involved and the increase in heavy weapons use and the increase in the length of conflict time involved, the higher the daily count of personnel killed and wounded. How the intensity affects the ratio of killed to wounded is not clear to me, so I will assume that the ratio remains the same.

There is no question that the daily tally of Ukrainians killed in the Russian MoD reports have increased since last fall and have now reached the levels illustrated by today's report.

Therefore we have to assume that the actual total of Ukrainian losses has increased beyond the 270,000-540,000 total reached if we assume only 500-1,000 total losses per day which was the average at the beginning of the war.

If we assume that the rate of casualties sustained by Ukraine increased beginning with the assault on Bahkmut, which began sometime between August and October,2022, then, taking the latter date, the rate of casualties has been increasing for the last nine months.

If we assume that the rate of casualties increased to double the original rate during that nine-month period, we can take the 15-30,000/month figure for the first 7-8 months of the war and double that to get 30-60,000/month losses for the last 9 months. Note that this does not take into account the speed of increase over those 9 months but merely assumes a constant rate, which is probably incorrect.

15-30,000/month times 8 months gives us the total for first 8 months of the war as 120,000-240,000.

30-60,000/month for the last nine months of the war gives us a total of 270,000-540,000.

So our total loss figure range for the last 18 months is:

(120,000 + 270,000) to (240,000 + 540,000) or: 390,000 to 780,000.

To this we need to add in two more categories: desertions and prisoners.

In the book "War in History" Niall Ferguson has a paper called "Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: Towards a Political Economy of Military Defeat" (available for free here) in which historical figures for the rate of prisoners taken during various wars are analyzed.

The rate of prisoners as a percentage of total mobilized is all over the place in the tables provided, ranging from 0.1 (the US percentage) to 15.8 (the Russian percentage.) The highest total is Austria-Hungary at 24.4. The average is 9.8.

If we take the average and round it to 10%, then depending on how many Ukrainian forces were mobilized during the conflict, we could determine the probable number of prisoners taken. Note that because this is a conflict in which the use of stand-off weapons such as artillery, missiles and air power are the primary weapons used, the rate of prisoners taken may be more or less than that.

Based on a statement by Ukrainian Defence Minister Resnikov in July, 2022, the armed forces had a strength of 700,000, not counting the border guard, national guard, or police. They have done several further waves of mobilization since then, so the actual total may be greater than that. This of course assumes the Minister's statement was accurate at the time.

I have been unable to find any accurate figures for Ukrainian prisoners. The New York Time in June, 2023, reported this:

"It is unclear how many Ukrainian soldiers are prisoners of war or missing in action. Russia has provided only partial lists of those it is holding, and Ukraine does not release any numbers. But human rights organizations say there are at least 8,000 to 10,000 prisoners, and Ukrainian officials did not dispute those figures."

Let's assume the actual rate of prisoners is between 5 and 10 percent. In that case Ukraine has lost 35,000-70,000 prisoners during the war.

To this we have to add the desertion rate. This figure is extremely hard to come by, even historically. Ferguson's article discusses the rate for British soldiers in both WWI and WWII, and concludes that, depending on the time period during the war, the rate was between 5 and 20 per 1000 soldiers, with the average being 10 in WWI and 7 in WWII.

It is well known that much of the Ukraine army subsequent to summer, 2022, is composed of conscripts. It can be supposed that the rate of desertion in the Ukrainian army is higher than in the Russian army or the British or US armies. If we therefore assume a figure of 10 per thousand, then if Ukraine mobilized at least 700,000 soldiers, they have a desertion figure of 7,000.

So we can compute the grand total of estimated Ukrainian losses as follows:

Killed and Wounded + Prisoners + Desertions.

Using the lowest numbers from each, this gives us:

390,000 + 35,000 + 7,000 or 432,000

780,000 + 70,000 + 7,000 or 857,000

Depending on what the actual total mobilization of Ukaine was, this gives us a means of estimating how many Ukrainian forces remain in service.

If the Ukrainian total strength was 700,000, then obviously the highest figure of 857,000 is inaccurate, as we know Ukraine has thousand of troops remaining on the battlefield.

However, we also know that Ukraine has had "assistance" from both foreign volunteers and reputedly also from NATO nation soldiers who have "resigned" from their national military and "volunteered" to serve in Ukraine. These personnel are referred to as "sheep-dipped", i.e., they are actually NATO forces, presumably under a unified command, who have been sent to reinforce the Ukrainian military without overtly involving NATO directly.

The estimated number of these forces is all over the place, ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 or more. At least 6,000 were actual volunteers from countries like the US, although reportedly this number has been cut in half as a result of deaths on the battlefield and the volunteers deciding to return to their home countries. The number of "sheep-dipped" is unknown but estimated at up to 10,000.

If we assume the lowest figure of 432,000 is correct, and that Ukraine had a maximum of 700,000 forces throughout the war, then we can estimate the remaining Ukrainian forces to be no more than 268,000.

If we assume the lowest figure and that Ukraine had a total mobilization of one million men, then we can estimate the Ukrainian forces to be no more than 568,000.

If we assume the highest figure is correct and that Ukraine had a total mobilization of one million men, then we can estimate the remaining Ukrainian forces to be no more than 143,000.

We can now estimate how long the war will continue before the Ukraine army is reduced to s state of ineffectiveness.

If Ukraine is losing forces at the initial rate at the start of the war of 15-30,000 troops per month, dividing 568,000 by that range of loss results in the war lasting no more than 19-38 months.

If Ukraine is losing forces at the initial rate at the start of the war of 15-30,000 troops per month, dividing 268,000 by that range of loss results in the war lasting no more than 9-17 months.

If Ukraine is losing forces at the estimated current rate of loss of 30-60,000 troops per month, dividing 268,000 by that range of loss results in the war lasting no more than 4.4-9 months.

I favor this last calculation as the most probably correct one. I do not believe that Ukraine had one million men under arms in total during the war or that Ukraine currently has losses at the same rate as at the beginning of the war.

However, we have to remember that an army does not collapse when its last man is killed. What matters are the concepts of "military effectiveness" and in particular "combat effectiveness".

"Military effectiveness" is defined as follows (depending on your source):

"Military effectiveness is defined as the ability to produce favorable military outcomes per se, including the outcomes of minor skirmishes at the tactical level of war and the outcomes of wars or even long-term politico-military competitions at the strategic or grand strategic levels of war."

"Combat effectiveness" is defined as follows (depending on your source):

"Combat effectiveness is the capacity or performance of a military force to succeed in undertaking an operation, mission or objective... Combat effectiveness is an aspect of military effectiveness and can be attributed to the strength of combat support including the quality and quantity of logistics, weapons and equipment as well as military tactics, the psychological states of soldiers, level of influence of leaders, skill and motivation that can arise from nationalism to survival are all capable of contributing to success on the battlefield."

Further definition of combat effectiveness from encyclopedia.com:

"Combat effectiveness is a combination of operational and tactical effectiveness, which is the performance of military units in direct contact with the enemy. Questions of operational effectiveness usually focus on the integration of forces of different combat specializations (land, air, sea) and nationality (allies); logistical sustainability for a campaign extended in time and/or distance; provisions for effective higher command in both the personal and the technical sense; the identification of fundamental enemy weaknesses; and the maximum combination of overwhelming firepower and surprising maneuver. Tactical effectiveness concentrates on the actual performance of combatant forces (infantry, armor, artillery, warships, combat aviation units) in engagements with the enemy. Operational and tactical effectiveness have an organic relationship; neither in isolation is likely to bring battlefield victory."

In other words, what matters here is whether the military in question can successfully perform an operation against its enemy such that it results in either significant territorial gain or significant losses of enemy personnel. By "significant" I refer to operations conducted on a higher tactical level than the squad, platoon or company level. In other words, if an army can not conduct a battalion, division, corp or army level operation which results in either significant territory gain or significant enemy personnel and equipment losses, that army is no longer effective.

This begins to get into complicated strategic and operational concepts which I am not qualified to discuss. Go ask Andrei Martyanov those questions - he has the education in the subject. It requires considerable mathematical and operational analysis to make informed statements on the subject, as any perusal of US military documents will prove. The bottom line however is simply that Ukraine’s combat effectiveness is in doubt.

Another study of the subject says this:

"Battlefield effectiveness requires states to perform three key tasks: to generate cohesive military units, to train those units in the performance of basic tactics, and to endow them with the initiative and coordination needed to conduct the complex operations crucial to effectiveness in modern battle."

If we look at Ukraine with regard to those three key tasks, clearly it is in trouble. It is using forced conscription to generate its military units, and it is using short-term NATO training of a limited number of Ukrainian troops in multiple locations in multiple foreign languages in multiple military subjects and even more short-term training of the bulk of its conscripts. This is going to result in seriously ineffective training and high rates of desertion, prisoners and lack of combat effectiveness.

In terms of "initiative and coordination", it appears to be almost entirely under the control of 1) the political leadership of Ukraine, i.e., Volodymyr Zelenskyy and 2) NATO (mostly British and US) military officers). The lack of effectiveness of these two command and control sources are clearly demonstrated in the utter failure of the Ukrainian spring-summer "offensive" to even penetrate the Russian 'security zones" in front of the Russian defensive lines after six weeks of effort.

Referring to the Ukrainian offensive and going back to my definition of an army's effectiveness, I think it is clear that Ukraine is no longer capable of conducting an effective operation at the battalion or higher level and is incapable of inflicting either serious losses (defined as losses capable of seriously affecting Russian combat capability) or obtaining significant territorial gains.

Now we tie this concept of "effectiveness" to the rate of Ukrainian personnel losses. At what point of Ukrainian personnel losses will Ukraine no longer be able to conduct effective military operations at the battalion or higher level? It seems clear that Ukraine is already at that point, despite potentially having a remaining force of over 200,000 troops.

This fact also mitigates against the probability of Ukraine having anywhere close to 500,000 troops or ever having had one million men under arms. If they had that many men still available, their 2023 offensive probably would not have failed to dramatically. The reality on the ground reinforces my belief that Ukraine has had a serious degradation in available manpower, as well as heavy weapons like armor and artillery.

Many of these remaining troops are stationed in the major cities west of the Dnieper river, or behind the immediate contact line, or near the border with Belarus. So they are not available for direct combat operations. We don't know how many actual combat effective forces Ukraine has on the contact line. There are Telegram channels and Web sites that will purport to know the location of every or most Ukrainian deployed units, but I take those with a grain of salt given the fluidity of the conflict.

Meanwhile, we know Russia had at least 80-100,000 regular army troops plus 25-50,000 or more Donbass militia plus Volunteer Battalions and the Russian Rosqvadia (National Guard) units at the start of the war for a total of 150-200,000 troops. These were subsequently augmented by the mobilization in fall, 2022, of 300,000 more Russian former regular army as well as 70,000 new recruits, of which at least 150,000 were added to the front line, with the remember training in bases near the border in Russia. The total available Russian forces capable of immediate commitment to the front is thus in the neighborhood of 570,000. It could be more as Russia has probably continued and possibly expanded its regular twice-annual recruitment and conscription drives. I've seen estimates of up to 750,000 Russian forces (which I view as plausible if unlikely), and even one million (a figure I consider way too high.)

So we have 268,000 Ukrainians (the most probable figure) lined up against 570,000 (minimum) Russians, with a Russian advantage of 10-to-1 in artillery, and massive Russian advantages in armor, missiles, and aviation. And Ukrainian losses at 30-60,000 per month out of that 268,000. And the Ukraine military increasingly being unable to conduct effective operations against Russian forces.

So how can anyone see this war lasting more than 3-6 months before the Ukraine military collapses entirely and is reduced to guerrilla attacks or hiding in the cities until rooted out by the Wagner mercenaries and/or Chechen urban assault fighters?

Short of NATO directly entering this war within the next 3-6 months, this war is over.